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George Washington’s Attorneys: The Political 
Selection of United States Attorneys at the Founding 
 
Scott Ingram* 
 
Impressed with a conviction that the due administration of 
justice is the firmest pillar of good government, I have 
considered the first arrangement of the judicial department as 
essential to the happiness of our country and to the stability of 
its’ political system—hence the selection of the fittest characters 
to expound the laws, and dispense justice, has been an 
invariable object of my anxious concern. 
George Washington to Edmund Randolph, Sept 28, 17891 
 
 
“. . .I have absolute right to do what I want to do with the 
Justice Department.” 
Donald Trump to Michael S. Schmidt, Dec 28, 20172 
 
 
Introduction 
 
George Washington clearly understood the judiciary’s 
importance.  Those whom he selected to fill judicial positions 
would establish a good government and maintain peace in the 
nation.  As a result, he sought the “fittest characters” to fill 
them.3  Today is no different; prosecutors wield tremendous 
power,4 as federal prosecutors can charge nearly anyone 
 
* Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, High Point University.  The author 
wishes to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Brianna Burns and 
Jessica Wallace. 
1.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to Edmund Randolph, 
U.S. Attorney Gen. (Sept. 28, 1789), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/05-04-02-0073. 
2.  NEW YORK TIMES, Excerpts from Trump’s Interview with the Times, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/ 
trump-interview-excerpts.html. 
3.  Letter from George Washington to Edmund Randolph, supra note 1. 
4.  See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, 
1
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courtesy of vague and broad criminal statutes and minimal 
systemic oversight.5  They have expanded their domain greatly 
since the Nation’s founding and original practices.6  This makes 
the character of federal prosecutors extremely important.7  
Prosecutors motivated by objectives beyond justice 
administration can use their discretionary power for 
inappropriate ends.8 
Current political and prosecutorial norms reflect the belief 
that the administration of justice must be insulated from 
partisan politics.9  Each day, federal prosecutors make decisions 
regarding people’s lives and liberty.10  The federal prosecutors 
decide whom to charge, for what and when.11  They can charge 
 
and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408-10 (2001) (describing the 
importance of prosecutorial charging power); Bennett L. Gershman, The Most 
Dangerous Power of the Prosecutor, 29 PACE L. REV. 1, 19-25 (2008) (identifying 
the contours of prosecutorial discretion); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as 
Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction 
Pulpit, 84 WASH. L.  REV. 35, 36–37 (2009) (distinguishing between a 
prosecutor’s minister of justice ethic and conviction ethic). 
5.  See Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking 
Back and Looking Forward, 58 DUKE L. J. 2087, 2089–90 (2009); Michael A, 
Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in 
Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 924–36 (2000) (comparing 
Congress and the Executive branch’s responsibility for and ability to control 
overfederalization of crime); see also HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES 
A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT (Encounter Books 2009). 
6.  See William McDonald, The Prosecutor’s Domain, in 11 THE 
PROSECUTOR 19–28 (Sage Publications, Inc., William McDonald, ed., 1979) 
(describing the expansion of prosecutor’s domain over time). 
7.  See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ 
Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065 (2014) (explaining the difference between 
individual prosecutors and their role perception). 
8.  See Heather Schoenfeld, Violated Trust: Conceptualizing Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.  JUST. 250 (2005) (identifying various 
methods by which prosecutors commit misconduct). 
9.  See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States 
Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J.  CRIM. L. 369, 370–71 (2009) (describing the 
relationship between politics and prosecution); Andrew Kent, Congress and the 
Independence of Federal Law Enforcement, 52 U.C. DAVIS L.  REV.  (forthcoming 
2018). 
10.  See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940). 
11.  See Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at its Zenith: 
The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 BOS. U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2017) (“Prosecutorial 
discretion refers to the power of the Executive to determine how, when, and 
whether to initiate and pursue enforcement proceedings” (footnote omitted)). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
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anyone so long as they have probable cause to believe the person 
committed a federal crime.12  Probable cause is not a high 
standard.13  Consequently, a federal prosecutor with political 
ambitions is able use prosecutorial power to advance partisan 
political purposes.14  Similarly, ambitious Justice Department 
lawyers can use their policy-making authority to target political 
opponents or politically-unpopular organizations.15  To make 
this less likely, norms developed to insulate federal prosecutors 
from political forces.16  The norms have insulate specific cases 
and some believe they should also include policy decisions.17 
This Article examines the relationship between the Nation’s 
first President and the selection of United States Attorneys.  It 
argues that politics played an important, if not primary, role in 
the President’s selections.  George Washington sought those who 
would represent the government’s interests, adhere to the 
government’s policies, and advance Washington’s political 
 
12.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 3. (“The complaint is a written statement of the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged. . . . [I]t must be made under 
oath before a magistrate judge . . .”); U. S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-2.030 
(U.S.A.M. 2018); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N  
2018); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).   
13.  See Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. 
L. REV. 951, 981, 995 (2003) (highlighting the differing perspectives on 
probable cause and its lack of practical use); Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to 
Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and Slobogin, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1136 (1998). 
14.  H.W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys—Whom Shall They Serve?, 
61 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 142–45 (1998). 
15.  See Gershman, supra note 4, at 11–16 (explaining potential political 
targeting of prosecutorial power). 
16.  See Kent, supra note 9, at 3–5; Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of 
Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1201–03 (2013); David Kris, 
Presidential Norms and the Special Counsel Investigation: Disclosures to 
Congress, LAWFARE BLOG (May 3, 2018, 4:50 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/presidential-norms-and-special-counsel-
investigation-disclosures-congress (stating “[t]here is a real norm of Justice 
Department independence from the president in the context of individual 
criminal cases, a real departure from the theory of a unitary executive 
branch“); see also U. S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.260 (U.S.A.M. 2018) (listing 
political associations, activities or beliefs as impermissible considerations). 
17.  Matthew Kahn, The Lawfare Podcast: Preserving Justice Department 
Independence, LAWFARE BLOG (Apr. 28, 2018, 1:30 PM), 
 https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-preserving-justice-department-
independence [hereinafter, Georgetown Law Panel Discussion]. 
3
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goals.18  His selections also demonstrated Washington’s 
requirement of loyalty to America.  In this respect, the 
politicization of United States Attorneys occurred at the outset.  
Part I of this Article defines politicization and identifies its four 
aspects.  Part II describes the United States Attorney position 
as understood through the 1789 Judiciary Act and state 
experience.  Part III examines how Washington’s selections and 
selection process included three of the four politicization 
categories.  The concluding Section briefly explores the 
ramifications of politicization and its potential benefits in 
today’s prosecutorial environment. 
 
I. Modern Assault on Modern Norms 
 
Recent presidential politics brought this norm into public 
view.  Repeatedly, the President has shown ignorance, if not 
outright disregard, of these prosecutorial norms.19  Concerns 
arose prior to the President’s inauguration.20  One commentator 
noted, “[t]he soft spot, the least tyrant-proof part of the 
 
18.  RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 595 (2010) (highlighting 
commentary from various historians on Washington’s appointments generally, 
with one biographer writing: “Washington believed that forming an honest, 
efficient civil service was a critical test for the young republic”); STANLEY 
ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 55 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (Washington had two 
strict rules for his appointments: first, no family members could receive 
appointment, and second, they had to support the Constitution); FORREST 
MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 38 (Univ. Press of Kan. 
1974) (stating that a historian of his presidency wrote: “Washington 
scrupulously declined to exploit the opportunity to develop a system of 
patronage”); JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA: 1789-1801, at 31–32 
(Waveland Press, Inc, 1998) (explaining that another historian, writing about 
the era, said, “[t]he President decided, by the application of three principal 
criteria: fitness, ‘former merits and sufferings in the service,’ and residence”). 
19.  See Bob Bauer, The Survival of Norms: The Department of Justice 
and the President’s ‘Absolute Rights,’ LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 10, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/survival-norms-department-justice-and-
presidents-absolute-rights; Protecting Independent Law Enforcement, PROTECT 
DEMOCRACY, https://protectdemocracy.org/independent-law-enforcement/ 
tracker/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2018) (providing a timeline of President Trump’s 
Administration’s statements that “[attack] the independence of law 
enforcement”). 
20.  Benjamin Wittes, Trump and the Powers of the American Presidency 
(Part I), LAWFARE BLOG (May 25, 2016, 3:44 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
trump-and-powers-american-presidency-part-i.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
ARTICLE 4_INGRAM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2019  7:42 PM 
2018 GEORGE WASHINGTON’S ATTORNEYS 167 
government, is the U.S. Department of Justice and the larger 
law enforcement and regulatory apparatus of the United States 
government.”21  In a later piece, the commentator explained: 
 
[Trump’s] promise [to appoint a special prosecutor 
to initiate charges against Presidential opponent 
Hillary Clinton] tramples on a number of 
cherished norms in the relationship between the 
Justice Department and the White House and in 
the conduct of the Justice Department itself. 
These norms restrict presidential and 
departmental behavior far more than the bare 
bones strictures of the Constitution. They are part 
of our constitutional fabric and rooted in 
important constitutional values. But our mode of 
enforcing them is not legal. It is political. It is a 
matter of our deepest expectations of the 
presidency and the Justice Department.22  
 
Once in office, the President wasted little time confirming 
fears that he would not adhere to these cherished norms.  Less 
than one month into his Presidency, Trump stated to then-FBI 
Director James Comey, “I hope you can see your way clear to 
letting this go, to letting Flynn go.  He is a good guy.  I hope you 
can let this go.”23  When Comey would not comply, Trump fired 
 
21.  Id. 
22.  Benjamin Wittes, Grab ‘Em by the Constitution: Trump and the 
Justice Department, LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 10, 2016, 3:07 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/grab-em-constitution-trump-and-justice-department 
(emphasis added). 
23.  Stephen Collinson et al., James Comey Testimony: Trump Asked Me 
to Let Flynn Investigation Go, CNNPOLITICS (June 8, 2017, 1:54 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/07/politics/james-comey-testimony-
released/index.html (stating that the White House, through Trump’s personal 
lawyer, denied that Trump asked Comey to stop the investigation); see also Bob 
Bauer, When Questions of Norms Become Questions of Law: Trump’s 
Conversations with Comey, LAWFARE BLOG (May 11, 2017, 8:38 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/when-questions-norms-become-questions-law-trumps-
conversations-comey (explaining the norm breaking behavior of this); David 
Nakamura, Trump Lawyer: President Never Told Comey ‘I Need Loyalty, I 
Expect Loyalty,’ WASH. POST (June 8, 2017, 2:18 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2017/live-updates/trump-white-
house/james-comey-testimony-what-we-learn/trump-lawyer-president-never-
5
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Comey.  This apparently occurred after receiving confirmation 
from Comey that Trump, himself, was not under investigation.24  
With Comey no longer running the investigation, the Justice 
Department selected former FBI Director and federal prosecutor 
Robert Mueller to act as special counsel.25  This angered the 
President; he did not control the investigation.26  He resorted to 
undermining the investigation with tweets but did not fire 
Mueller.27 
Trump’s intervention efforts were not his only norm-
breaking behaviors.  During his first summer as President, 
Trump interviewed potential United States Attorney nominees 
for the Southern District of New York and Washington, D.C.28  
Presidents rarely speak to United States Attorneys, let alone 
conduct interviews.  Former United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, endured Trump’s 
interview process after never speaking with President Barack 
Obama.29  At the same time, Administration critics cited a White 
 
told-comey-i-need-loyalty-i-expect-loyalty/?utm_term=.257311a8a7dc. 
24.  See Bauer, supra note 19 (discussing the norm-breaking aspect of this 
behavior); Jack Goldsmith, The President Can’t Kill the Mueller Investigation, 
LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 1, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
president-cant-kill-mueller-investigation (explaining the significance of the 
norm and its observance by Attorney General Sessions and Deputy Attorney 
General Rosenstein, among others); Partial Transcript: NBC News Interview 
with Donald Trump, CNNPOLITICS (May 11, 2017, 2:29 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/11/politics/transcript-donald-trump-nbc-news/; 
Watch Lester Holt’s Extended Interview with President Trump, NBC NEWS 
(May 11, 2017, 2:29PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/pres-
trump-s-extended-exclusive-interview-with-lester-holt-at-the-white-house-
941854787582. 
25.  Rebecca R. Ruiz & Mark Landler, Robert Mueller, Former F.B.I. 
Director, Is Named Special Counsel for Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 
17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/politics/robert-mueller-
special-counsel-russia-investigation.html. 
26.  Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Humiliated Jeff 
Sessions After Mueller Appointment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/us/politics/jeff-sessions-trump.html.  
27.  Jeff Zeleny, Trump Will Not Call for Firing of Mueller, Officials Say, 
CNNPOLITICS (Oct. 30, 2017, 10:43 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/30/ 
politics/president-donald-trump-robert-mueller/index.html. 
28.  Chris Smith, Why Is Trump Personally Interviewing U.S. Attorney 
Candidates for New York and D.C.?, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 26, 2017, 6:57 PM), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/10/trump-personally-interviews-us-
attorney-candidates-for-new-york-and-dc. 
29.  Edward-Isaac Dovere, Preet Bharara Reads Bob Mueller’s Tea Leaves, 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
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House Press Conference featuring Principal Associate Deputy 
Attorney General Rob Hur.30  This “renewed warnings of blurred 
ethical lines between the White House and law enforcement.”31  
One former career Justice Department official noted that the 
Justice Department “generally goes to great lengths to maintain 
arms length [sic] distance from the White House when it comes 
to when it comes to [sic] specific criminal or investigative 
matters.”32  Yet, Trump went further; one month into his 
presidency, Trump announced that he “called the Justice 
Department to look into the leaks” involving phone calls he made 
to certain foreign leaders.33  The President has the absolute 
power to do these things but norms have developed over time 
such that the President does not ordinarily do these things.34 
Over time, Trump learned he could not “control” the Justice 
Department, or, at least, not as much as he wished.35  The non-
prosecution of 2016 Democratic Presidential candidate, Hilary 
Clinton, provides the strongest example.36  His campaign 
promise to prosecute her for using a private email server to save 
national security information remains unfulfilled.  The 
President stated: 
 
The saddest thing is, because I am the President 
of the United States, I am not supposed to be 
involved with the Justice Department. I’m not 
supposed to be involved with the FBI. I’m not 
 
POLITICO MAG. (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 
2017/10/31/preet-bharara-reads-bob-muellers-tea-leaves-215767.  
30.  Josh Gerstein, Justice Department Briefing at White House Fuels 
Ethics Worries, POLITICO (July 27, 2017, 11:55 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/27/justice-department-briefing-fuels-
ethics-worries-241063. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Charlie Savage & Eric Lichtblau, Trump Directs Justice Department 
to Investigate ‘Criminal Leaks,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/justice-department-leak-
investigation-trump.html. 
34.  Georgetown Law Panel Discussion, supra note 17; see also Saikrishna 
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 532 (2005). 
35.  Excerpts from Trump’s Interview, supra note 2. 
36.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW 
OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION 37–39 (2018).  
7
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supposed to be doing the kind of things I would 
love to be doing and I am very frustrated by it.37 
 
President Trump seeks to direct the Justice Department on 
a specific case.38  Instead, Justice Department employees 
frustrated Trump’s efforts, which, in the words of one 
commentator, was an unwitting tribute to their work.39 
President Trump’s norm-breaking approach contrasts 
markedly with his predecessor, Barack Obama.  As a 
constitutional law professor, President Obama diligently 
observed executive behavior norms.40  For example, following a 
press conference on immigration, someone asked President 
Obama about the investigation of Maricopa County, Arizona 
sheriff Joe Arpaio.41  Obama responded, “I have to be careful 
 
37.  Radio Interview by Larry O’Connor with Donald J. Trump, U.S. 
President, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 3, 2017), http://www.wmal.com/2017/11/ 
03/listen-president-donald-trump-to-larry-oconnor-im-very-unhappy-the-
justice-department-isnt-going-after-hillary-clinton/.  
38.  See also Bob Bauer, The Survival of Norms: The Department of Justice 
and the President’s ‘Absolute Rights,’ LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 1, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/survival-norms-department-justice-and-
presidents-absolute-rights. 
39.  Benjamin Wittes, ‘The Saddest Thing’: President Trump 
Acknowledges Constraint, LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 3, 2017, 1:02 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/saddest-thing-president-trump-acknowledges-
constraint. 
40.  Barack Obama, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
1600/presidents/barackobama (last visited Oct. 29, 2018) (looking at how 
closely President Obama followed this norm can be debated); see also CHARLIE 
SAVAGE, POWER WARS: THE RELENTLESS RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND 
SECRECY 318 (Back Bay Books rev. ed. 2017) (discussing how the Obama 
administration could not contact prosecutors to instruct them to offer a plea 
deal in the Omar Khadr case); Bauer, supra note 38 (discussing how Bauer 
remained out of discussions on the prosecution of John Edwards for campaign 
finance violations despite Bauer’s belief, as White House Counsel, that the 
legal theory was problematic); Eric Tucker, Why the Justice Department 
Operates Free of White House Sway, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), 
http://beta.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-justice-department-white-
house-20161123-story.html; but see Charlotte Allen, Politicizing Justice, 
WEEKLY STANDARD (Feb. 25, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/charlotte-allen/politicizing-justice; Andrew 
C. McCarthy, Gee, I’m Starting to Think the Obama DOJ Just Might Be 
Politicized, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 14, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/01/obama-justice-department-political/. 
41.  Interview by Jose Siade with Barack Obama, U.S. President in 
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 28, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
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about commenting on individual cases.  That’s handled typically 
by the Department of Justice or these other agencies.”42  His 
response came, in part, from a memo drafted by President 
George W. Bush’s Attorney General Michael Mukasey, outlining 
relations between the Justice Department and the White 
House.43  Mukasey wrote, “[c]ommunications with respect to 
pending criminal or civil-enforcement matters, however, must 
be limited.  Therefore, the Department will advise the White 
House about such criminal or civil-enforcement matters only 
where it is important for the performance of the President’s 
duties and where appropriate from a law enforcement 
perspective.”44  Later in the memo, Mukasey described how 
communications would occur: 
 
With the exception of national security related 
matters, which are discussed below, all initial 
communications between the White House staff 
and the Justice Department regarding any 
specific pending Department investigation or 
criminal or civil-enforcement matter should 
involve only the Counsel to the President or 
Deputy Counsel to the President and the Attorney 
General or Deputy Attorney General.45 
 
This significantly narrows the communication channels 
between the White House and the Justice Department. 
Attorney General Mukasey’s White House communications 
memo resulted from the last major controversy arising from 
political interference into Justice Department operations. In late 
2004 and into 2005, the George W. Bush Administration 
discussed firing United States Attorneys who were not “loyal 
 
press-office/2011/09/28/remarks-president-open-questions-roundtable#. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, U.S. Attorney Gen. to Heads 
of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 19, 2007), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2008/04/15/ag-121907.pdf. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. at 2. 
9
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Bushies.”46  As 2006 progressed, seven names emerged.47  By 
December, the White House approved firing those seven United 
States Attorneys.48  Common traits among those fired were an 
apparent unwillingness to pursue specific public corruption 
cases against Democrats, unwillingness to cooperate with 
Congressional supporters, and not prosecuting a sufficient 
number of certain types of cases.49 
Legal scholars identified these rationales as undue political 
influence on the administration of justice.  Professor Laurie 
Levenson asserted that the firing “jeopardized the credibility of 
federal prosecutors, disillusioned career prosecutors in those 
positions, and called into question the separation between 
professionalism and politics in the enforcement of our federal 
laws.”50  Professor Ellen Pogdor argued that the firings “provide 
a sharp contrast to the history and tradition of a nonpolitical 
DOJ.”51  Professor Sara Sun Beale examined the firings from the 
context of prosecutorial neutrality.52  She wrote: 
 
The position of U.S. Attorney is . . . plainly 
political . . . .  Once selected, however, U.S. 
Attorneys are expected to leave behind partisan 
politics, adhering to the norm of prosecutorial 
neutrality. In this context, prosecutorial 
neutrality means, at a minimum, that the  
decision whether and when to bring charges in 
individual cases  should be made without regard 
to  either the political affiliation of the individuals 
 
46.  Ari Shapiro, Timeline: Behind the Firing of Eight U.S. Attorneys, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 15, 2007, 3:07 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=8901997.  
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. 
49.  See Beale, supra note 9, at 374–80; see also Richman, supra note 5, at 
2100 (describing mechanisms of control over federal criminal enforcement). 
50.  Laurie L. Levenson, Live and Learn: Depoliticizing the Interim 
Appointments of U.S. Attorneys, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 301–02 (2008). 
51.  Ellen S. Podgor, The Tainted Federal Prosecutor in an 
Overcriminalized Justice System, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1569, 1571–72 
(2010). 
52.  See Beale, supra note 9, at 370–71; see also H. Richard Uviller, The 
Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1695 (2000) (referencing prosecutorial neutrality). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
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involved or the resulting benefit (or harm) to 
either political party.53 
 
Professor David Driesen reviewed the firings from a unitary 
executive theory.54  This theory places the President over the 
entire Administration, thus making Justice Department 
political independence a contradiction.55  Driesen resolved this, 
arguing that a president is only justified firing federal 
prosecutors who do not faithfully execute the law.56  Finally, 
Political Science Professor James Eisenstein viewed the firings 
from an organizational perspective.  The firings represented a 
repeated Justice Department process to gain more control over 
United States Attorneys.57  From this perspective, political 
influence equates with policy enforcement.  If the attorneys did 
not follow policy, they could be removed.  One fired United States 
Attorney, David Iglesias, concurred with Eisenstein that United 
States Attorney independence motivated the firings, but Iglesias 
insisted adhering to political wishes was not part of his official 
oath, instead it was to uphold the Constitution.58 
The norm against political involvement in prosecutorial 
decisions originated relatively recently.  By the 1970s, the 
norm’s formation was underway, but was accelerated by 
President Nixon’s conduct during the Watergate investigation.59  
When the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 
refused to fire the special prosecutor, Nixon fired them.60  This 
 
53.  Beale, supra note 9, at 370–71. 
54.  David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 
707, 714–15 (2008) (unitary executive theory is the notion that the president 
has complete control over the executive branch). 
55.  Id. at 709. 
56.  Id. at 727. 
57.  James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice’s 
Centralization Efforts in Historical Context, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 219, 220–21 
(2008). 
58.  David C. Iglesias, A Prosecutor’s Non-Negotiables: Integrity and 
Independence, 44 GA. L. REV. 939, 943 (2010). 
59.  Kent, supra note 9, at 3–5; see also Constance O’Keefe & Peter 
Safirstein, Note, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night 
Massacre: An Examination of the Practical, Constitutional, and Political 
Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 
49 BROOK. L. REV. 113, 117–18 (1982). 
60.  See O’Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 59. 
11
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led to a movement for career federal prosecutors who remain, 
regardless of which party controls the Presidency and the 
Justice Department.61  Prior to this, most assistants remained 
only as long as the United States Attorney remained.62  This 
dynamic created an overt connection between federal 
prosecutors and an administration. 
The connection between prosecutors and politics vacillated 
prior to Nixon’s Administration.63  Nixon’s Justice Department 
emphasized that federal prosecutors must adhere to 
Administration policy and promote it through political activity.64  
This is true even though the Southern District of New York, 
renowned for its independence, trained political operatives and 
used its power to undermine Democratic city leadership.65  
Future Republican Presidential Candidate Thomas Dewey 
established his political credentials as an Assistant United 
States Attorney during President Hoover’s Administration.66  
When Franklin Roosevelt assumed the Presidency, Dewey 
resigned with his mentor, United States Attorney George 
 
61.  Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting 
in United States Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their 
Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 274, 286–87 (2002).  Today, Assistant United 
States Attorneys work without any connection to the United States Attorney.  
Id.  Assistants remain in office despite Administration changes and party 
changes.  Id.  While this insulates assistants from political preferences, it has 
some effects on agenda setting.  Professor Lochner argues that (1) agenda 
setting is an inherently political act; (2) institutional structures affect 
prosecutorial agendas; (3) present institutional structures are ill-equipped to 
handle the unique difficulties and opportunities that stem from a growing 
league of career prosecutors.  Id.  Lochner argues that this makes career 
prosecutors hard to motivate.  Id.  They view United States Attorneys as 
political appointees who have no sense about what makes a good criminal case 
or what cases should be prosecuted.  Id. 
62.  See Eisenstein, supra note 57, at 227–29. 
63.  NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789-1990, at 32–35 (Univ. Press of Kan. 1992) 
(arguing that there have been three norms of attorney general behavior: (1) 
independent from executive control; (2) nonpartisanship (usually emerges post 
scandal); and (3) loyalty to president as part of cabinet, and that attorneys 
general can fall along a continuum from political to neutral). 
64.  JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS 
IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 37–38 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1978). 
65.  MARY M. STOLBERG, FIGHTING ORGANIZED CRIME: POLITICS, JUSTICE, 
AND THE LEGACY OF THOMAS E. DEWEY 67–77 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1995). 
66.  Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
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Medalie.67  Several years before this, Attorney General Harry 
Daughterty used his position to coerce campaign funds from 
German interests who hoped to regain assets unlawfully seized 
during World War I.68  Daughtery also allegedly sold pardons 
and refused to investigate the Teapot Dome scandal because of 
its adverse potential adverse.69  Prior to this, President Grant’s 
personal secretary, Orville Babcock, faced an indictment for 
conspiring with St. Louis revenue officials to defraud the 
government of millions of dollars of whiskey tax money.70  
During one trial, special prosecutor John Henderson, alluded to 
Grant during closing argument.71  This infuriated Grant, who 
then fired Henderson.72  This impaired the Grant 
Administration’s prosecution of Grant’s personal secretary.73  
Finally, when Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency, 
becoming the first opposition party President, he refused to re-
nominate several United States Attorneys that Adams 
appointed but Congress did not confirm, citing their Federalist 
credentials as justification.74  Jefferson replaced them with 
Republican supporters.75  Toward the end of his second term, 
Jefferson imposed an embargo on British trade that required 
judicial enforcement.76  Many United States Attorneys in the 
northeast offered their resignations because they refused to 
enforce the embargo.77  The Massachusetts United States 
 
67.  Id. 
68.  LATON MCCARTNEY, THE TEAPOT DOME SCANDAL: HOW BIG OIL 
BOUGHT THE HARDING WHITE HOUSE AND TRIED TO STEAL THE COUNTRY 71 
(Random House Trade Paperback ed. 2009). 
69.  Id. at 72. 
70.  2 ALLAN NEVINS, HAMILTON FISH: THE INNER HISTORY OF THE GRANT 
ADMINISTRATION 786–90 (Frederick Ungar Publ’g Co. rev. ed. 1957). 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. (explaining that Henderson cast one of the Republican votes 
against removing President Andrew Johnson from office in the Nation’s first 
presidential impeachment trial); see also Ralph J. Roske, The Seven Martyrs? 
64 AM. HIST. REV. 323, 328 (1959). 
73.  NEVINS, supra note 70, at 786–90. 
74.  RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN 
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 33, 40 (Oxford Univ. Press 1971). 
75.  Id. 
76.  Douglas Lamar Jones, “The Caprice of Juries”: The Enforcement of 
the Jeffersonian Embargo in Massachusetts, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307, 311–
12 (1980). 
77.  LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
13
ARTICLE 4_INGRAM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2019  7:42 PM 
176 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.1 
Attorney, George Blake, actively undermined enforcement.78  As 
these examples demonstrate, United States Attorneys and their 
assistants have long been politicized. 
 
II. Politicization and Prosecution 
 
Politicization has become a code word for complaints about 
the government’s use of law enforcement power. When the 
government makes a controversial criminal law enforcement 
decision, critics assert that the Justice Department has become 
politicized.79  These conflicting accusations impede the 
usefulness of politicization to determine the propriety of 
Administration and/or Justice Department decisions.  This 
section defines politicization by dividing it into four types, each 
type connecting the political process to criminal prosecution.  
This more nuanced definition provides insight into how politics 
pervades prosecution.80 
Of the different paths through which politics affects 
prosecution, policy likely is the most palatable.  Politicization 
through policy uses criminal prosecution choices to advance 
particular policy goals.  These policy goals are identified by a 
particular political party.  Discussion about politics and policy 
focuses upon who should make the decision rather than whether 
politics is a permissible basis.  Professor Eisenstein observed 
this during his study of federal prosecutors in the 1960s.81 He 
 
HISTORY 1801-1829, at 414–15 (MacMillan Co. 1961). 
78.  Id. at 455. 
79.  See, e.g., Allen, supra note 40; McCarthy, supra note 40 (the author 
is a former Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York and prosecuted high-profile terrorism cases); but see Cheryl K. Chumley, 
Eric Holder: I Fixed George W. Bush’s Partisan Justice Department, WASH. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/4/eric-
holder-i-fixed-george-w-bushs-politicized-jus/.  
80.  See Steven I. Friedland, “Advice and Consent” in the Appointments 
Clause: From Another Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 173 (2015), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.g
oogle.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1010&context=dlj_online; Russell L. 
Weaver, “Advice and Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE L.J. 1717 
(2015) (explaining that a similar approach was used by Professors Weaver and 
Friedland in their debate about the historical role the Senate played in the 
advice and consent of judicial appointments). 
81.  See generally EISENSTEIN, supra note 64. 
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saw tension between the Justice Department in Washington, 
D.C., and the United States Attorney’s offices, located in each 
federal district throughout the United States.82  The Attorney 
General is the nation’s chief law enforcement officer and the 
United States Attorney is a federal district’s chief law 
enforcement officer.83  For uniform law enforcement, the 
Attorney General must establish policy preferences because the 
government cannot prosecute every federal law violation.84  
Presumably, United States Attorneys will adhere to the 
Administration’s policy preferences.85  At the same time, each 
district presents unique problems which the United States 
Attorney must address, especially those that the state cannot or 
will not address.86  Sometimes the United States Attorney must 
choose between district issues and national priorities.87  These 
conflicts must be resolved internally, through bureaucratic 
politics.88 
The magnitude and frequency of disputes between the 
Justice Department and United States Attorneys can be 
minimized by selecting United States Attorneys based upon 
political affiliation and ideology. This is another method for 
politicizing prosecution.  Presidential administrations use the 
United States Attorney position to reward political loyalty, 
especially at the local level.89  Politically-motivated selection 
ensures loyalty.  Appointees will adhere to the Administration’s 
policies.90Patronage often conflicts with merit-based selection.91  
 
82.  Id. at 4–8, 16. 
83.  Levenson, supra note 50, at 303–05. 
84.  Richman, supra note 5, at 2097–2100. 
85.  See J. Richard Broughton, Politics, Prosecutors, and the Presidency in 
the Shadows of Watergate, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 170–71 (2012); Perry, supra 
note 14, at 142–43. 
86.  Tom Rickhoff, The U.S. Attorney: Fateful Powers Limited, 28 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 499, 504–08 (1997) (using the Western District of Texas as an 
example of the need for local control). 
87.  See id.; Andrew B. Whitford, Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency 
Structure, and Democratic Responsiveness: The Case of the United States 
Attorneys, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 3, 6 (2002). 
88.  Whitford, supra note 87, at 12–13. 
89.  Beale, supra note 9, at 372–73. 
90.  Richman, supra note 5, at 2104–05 (outlining the steps taken by Bush 
Administration to put loyal U.S. Attorneys in place). 
91.  Griffin B. Bell & Daniel J. Meador, Appointing United States 
Attorneys, 9 J. L. & POL. 247, 249–51 (1993) (describing the effects of merit-
15
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Party loyalists, even those with the proper statutory 
qualifications, are not always the most able.92  Assuming some 
degree of competence is desired, the question becomes the 
balance between political loyalty and legal ability. 
Loyalty causes people to act on behalf of those to whom 
loyalty is owed.  In a  prosecutorial context, party loyalists can 
channel prosecutorial power to serve the interests of the 
prosecutor’s  political party, thus creating another  politicization 
method.93  To exercise prosecutorial power, prosecutors only 
need  probable cause that a person violated a vaguely worded 
and broadly written criminal statute.94  In a world where 
accusations equate to presumptions of guilt, a politically-
motivated prosecutor can use criminal charges to damage 
opposition candidates if not eliminate them.95  While the charges 
themselves might cause damage, the prosecutor must still prove 
the case to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt so federal 
prosecutors cannot stray too far from what can be proven.96  
Similarly, prosecutors may use their position to advance 
particular  political interests by targeting opposing fundraisers  
or prominent supporters.97  By selecting  opposition interests for 
investigation,  prosecutors are more likely to find actual crimes 
 
only selection during the Carter Administration). 
92.  See Perry, supra note 14, at 142–46 (discussing different 
characteristics and how their interaction affects decision-making); Rickhoff, 
supra note 86, at 518–20 (identifying ideal characteristics). 
93.  Levenson, supra note 50, at 309–10. 
94.  See generally Lerner, supra note 13. 
95.  See generally Richard L. Lippke, The Prosecutor and the Presumption 
of Innocence, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 337 (2014) (explaining the relationship 
between prosecutors and the presumption of guilt); Anna Roberts, Arrest as 
Guilt, ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (describing the court system and how it 
views arrests as guilt). 
96.  See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.300 (U.S.A.M. 2018) (“Once the 
decision to prosecute has been made, the attorney for the government should 
charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offenses. By definition, 
the most serious offenses are those that carry the most substantial guidelines 
sentence, including mandatory minimum sentences.”); Larry Laudan, Is 
Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, in PUB. LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER, 
at 295 (Ser. No. 144, 2003) (on the ambiguity of reasonable doubt); Miller W. 
Shealy, Jr., A Reasonable Doubt About “Reasonable Doubt,” 65 OKLA. L. REV. 
225 (2013) (discussing the origins of reasonable doubt). 
97.  See Bruce A. Green & Fred V. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 858–59 (2004). 
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committed by opposition interests.98 
However, criminal investigations do not always target the 
opposition.  Presidents may find that their Administration or 
their political allies become the target of a criminal 
investigation.99  The President may respond by using 
prosecutorial powers as a shield, thus the fourth means of 
politicization.  Presidents can remove prosecutors suspected of 
disloyalty and replace them with more loyal officers.100  They can 
also terminate the investigation.101 
Of these four politicization categories, policy is the most 
palatable to modern sympathies.  Prosecution is an inherently 
political act.102  Presumably, these are candidates who win 
elections because their policy choices are more popular.103  Thus, 
an Administration may legitimately use policy preferences when 
governing, including when making criminal prosecution 
decisions.  Patronage is less palatable than policy, though still 
accepted at certain levels.  Incoming administrations reward top 
advisors with policy positions; however, the advisors should 
 
98.  See W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the 
Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2009) (discussing how all 
government policies discriminate in some way). 
99.  See Josh Gerstein, The Fraught Political History of Special 
Prosecutors, POLITICO (Mar. 2, 2017, 3:24 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/special-prosecutors-political-history-
235610); Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the Independent Counsel Law: 
Secrets of an Independent Counsel, PBS.ORG (May 1998), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/counsel/office/history.html. 
100.  See generally Beale, supra note 9; Levenson, supra note 50; Podgor, 
supra note 51. 
101.  See Mark Greenberg, Can Trump Obstruct Justice?, in PUB. LAW & 
LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER (Ser. No. 18-24, 2018); Josh Blackman, What 
Obstruction Law Applies to the President?, LAWFARE BLOG (June 6, 2018, 12:00 
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-obstruction-law-applies-president. 
102.  See Broughton, supra note 85, at 167-69; Lochner, supra note 61, at 
273; Perry, supra note 14, at 131–32. 
103.  Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J.  CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 785, 797–98 (2012) (“Legislators and elected chief prosecutors 
serve as professional delegates of a given constituency.  For representative 
democracy to work—that is, for the will of the people to be served by its 
delegates—lawmakers and chief law enforcers must be accessible to the 
citizenry, responsive to popular demands, and accountable for their decisions.” 
(citation omitted)); see generally Lawrence J. Grossback et al., Electoral 
Mandates in American Politics, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 711 (2007) (discussing 
electoral mandates finding that electoral mandates exist in the American 
political process). 
17
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have a high-level of legal ability.104  When prosecutors use their 
discretionary authority for partisan purposes, they cross a line.  
Using the legal process to achieve political advantage impugns 
the legal system’s apparent objectivity.105  Finally, 
administrations who use political power to shield themselves 
from criminal liability place themselves above the law.106 
 
III. The Political Context of Washington’s Selections 
 
Throughout George Washington’s eight years as President, 
policy, patronage and partisanship played a significant role in 
his United States Attorney appointments.  Washington 
understood these appointments visually represented federal 
government.  If the people respected the appointments then the 
people would, in turn, respect the fledgling national government.  
This meant those hired had to endorse Washington’s vision for 
the nation as expressed in policy decisions.  The people he 
selected had to be loyal to the federal government.  They had to 
actively advance its political interests. 
To understand Washington’s politicized selections, one must 
understand the political context of the time and how the United 
States Attorney role fit within that context.  Although the issues 
differed, today’s sharp political divisions replicate those, which 
existed as Washington made his appointments.  As the President 
noted in his letter to Attorney General nominee Randolph, 
selecting the best people as United States Attorneys was crucial 
to the new government’s success. 
 
A. The Perception and Role of USDAs 
 
While the 1787 Constitutional  Convention left several 
issues  unresolved, the most significant was the Judiciary.107 
 
104.  Beale, supra note 9, at 370–71. 
105.  Levenson, supra note 50, at 309–10; Podgor, supra note 51, at 1582. 
106.  See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: 
Legal Accountability and the Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
361, 398–400 (1993) (using the Iran-Contra investigation as an example of how 
Presidents can shield themselves and allies from investigation). 
107.  Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 
1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1424–25 
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Congress first met in 1789 and it addressed the  judicial 
issues.108  A senate committee consulted with the fledgling 
Nation’s  legal leaders  and debated the  Judiciary Act’s 
details.109  One issue was the creation of federal courts in each 
state.110  With a federal district court in each state, the 
committee understood that the federal government required an 
attorney in each state to represent federal interests.111 The 
federal government  created United  States Attorneys.112  United  
States Attorneys had to  meet two statutory requirements: (1) a  
meet person and (2)  learned in the law.113 Washington   
 
(1989). 
108.  WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 
1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 4–
7 (Wythe Holt & L. H. LaRue eds., Univ. of Okla. Press 1990); David P. Currie, 
The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of 
Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. CHI. UNBOUND 161, 208–09 (1995); 
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 
37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 59–63 (1923). 
109.  Maeva Marcus, The Judiciary Act of 1789 Political Compromise or 
Constitutional Interpretation, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON 
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 15–16 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992); RITZ, supra 
note 108, at 16. 
110.  Marcus, supra note 109, at 17–18; Warren, supra note 108, at 66–
67. 
111.  Gerhard Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial 
Independence, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY 
ACT OF 1789, at 286 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992); Marcus, supra note 109, at 20–
21; Currie, supra note 108, at 209–14; Warren, supra note 108, at 108–09. 
112.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
113.  Id.  Despite the plethora of research on the Attorney General and 
United States Attorneys that references the requirement that those who hold 
the position meet people, the term is never defined.  Historical research in other 
areas employs the term when quoting texts from the 17th and early 18th 
centuries.  In a 1661 Boston General Court Decree, the Court had the power to 
issue arrest warrants for Quakers.  Henry Cadbury, The King’s Missive, in 63 
QUAKER HIST. 117, 120 (1974).  These warrants could be directed to the 
constable or, in the constable’s absence, “to any other meet person . . . .”  Id.  In 
a 1715 prenuptial document, a woman stipulated that “her self [sic] or with the 
[a]ssistance of [s]uch meet person or persons whom [s]he shall appoint . . .” 
may control her wealth.  Virginia Bernhard, Cotton Mather’s “Most Unhappy 
Wife”: Reflections on the Uses of Historical Evidence, 60 NEW ENG. Q. 341, 355 
(1987).  In 1677, as a pastor left his congregation, the congregation requested 
the pastor’s “help and advise [sic] and direction respecting a meet person for 
that work . . . .”  Walter R. Steiner, The Reverend Gershom Bulkeley of 
Connecticut, An Eminent Clerical Physician, 2 MED. LIBR. & HIST. J. 91, 93 
(1904).  From these three uses it appears that “meet person” refers to a person 
who will act in the place of or in coordination with someone else.  The term also 
appears in a 19th century British sermon on the nativity by Reverend Lancelot 
19
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prepared his selections, as he was aware of the committee’s 
plans.114 
Washington considered the United States Attorneys’ part of 
the judiciary.  Four key pieces of evidence demonstrate this: 
first, traditional state practice made district attorneys judicial 
figures.  Second, by including them within the Judiciary Act, 
Congress indicated its understanding.  Washington had no 
reason to disagree.  Third, in Washington’s letter informing 
Randolph of his nomination, Washington discussed the qualities 
of those for the judiciary.  The letter’s context indicates 
Washington believed those representing the government fell 
into this category.  Finally, Washington included the United 
States District Attorneys in the same appointment message as 
federal judges. 
In the years preceding Washington’s first United States 
Attorney appointments, prosecutors began shifting from purely 
private attorneys to government-appointed, sometimes by the 
local judiciary.115  Criminal prosecution had been largely a 
 
Andrewes.  LANCELOT ANDREWES, SERMONS OF THE NATIVITY AND OF 
REPENTANCE AND FASTING 23 (1878)  In reference to Jesus’s relationship as a 
“Child” or “Son,” Andrewes uses “meet person” three times.  Id.  “Therefore, 
though two natures, yet but one Person in both.  A meet person to make a 
Mediator of God and man, as symbolizing with either, God and man.  A meet 
person, if there be division between them, as there was, and ‘great thoughts of 
heart’ for it, to make an union ; ex utroque unum, seeing He was unum ex 
utroque.  Not man only ; there lacked the shoulder of power.  Not God only ; 
there lacked the shoulder of justice ; but both together.  And so have ye the two 
Supporters of all, 1. Justice, and 2. Power.  A meet Person to cease hostility, as 
having taken pledges of both Heaven and earth—the chief nature in Heaven, 
and the chief on earth.”  Id.  In these instances, “meet person” refers to someone 
who brings two sides together. Id.  Most likely, the Act’s drafters had some 
combination of meanings in mind.  To stand in for someone else requires good 
character and trustworthiness.  Therefore, “meet person,” as used in this 
article, refers to a person of high-character. 
114.  By late May, 1789, Washington began receiving correspondence 
soliciting a position under the newly introduced judiciary bill.  See, e.g., Letter 
from Arthur Lee to George Washington, U.S. President (May 21, 1789), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-02-02-0256; Letter 
from Benjamin Nicholson, Lieutenant Colonel, Balt. Town Battalion, to George 
Washington, U.S. President, n.1 (May 27, 1789), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-02-02-0288. 
115.  JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 
15–21 (Lexington Books 1980); Yue Ma, Exploring the Origins of Public 
Prosecution, 18 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 190, 198–201 (2008). 
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private pursuit.116  Crime victims pursued offenders through the 
courts, pleading their own cases in minor matters and securing 
the services of attorneys in serious matters.117  Not every crime 
had an identifiable victim;118 moral offenses often only had 
society as a victim.119  In some places this meant those offenses 
were not prosecuted.120  To remedy this, some states hired local 
attorneys to prosecute.121  In others states, the Attorney General 
initiated the cases.122  The new federal courts would not 
adjudicate victim crimes as most federal crimes were against the 
federal government.123  If Washington, himself, did not know 
 
116. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality 
of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511 (1994) (pointing out a significant 
body of literature on the use of private prosecution in the United States); 
Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the Nineteenth 
Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43 (1995); Craig B. Little & 
Christopher P. Sheffield, Frontiers and Criminal Justice: English Private 
Prosecution Societies and American Vigilantism in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 796 (1983); Andrew Sidman, The 
Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 754 (1975); Allen 
Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, 
the District Attorney and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568 
(1984); John A.J. Ward, Private Prosecution—the Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N. 
C L. REV. 1171 (1972). 
117.  ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 38 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1989). 
118.  David H. Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early 
America, 1 CRIME & JUST. IN AM. HIST. 127, 170–72 (1991); Douglas Greenberg, 
Crime, Law Enforcement, and Social Control in Colonial America, 26 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 293 (1982). 
119.  Flaherty, supra note 118; Greenberg, supra note 118. 
120.  Greenberg, supra note 118. 
121.  Ma, supra note 115, at 199. 
122.  Id. at 199–201. 
123.  Most early federal crimes consisted of crimes against the 
government such as theft of mail, counterfeiting currency or evading customs.  
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 71 
(Basic Books, 1993).  When the federal government had jurisdiction over 
federal crimes, these were based on federal jurisdiction over crimes occurring 
on the high seas.  See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against 
the United States, 1 Stat. 112 (1790); see also Robert C. Palmer, The Federal 
Common Law of Crime, 4 LAW. & HIST. REV. 267 (1986) (discussing the 
scholarly debate regarding the application of common law of crimes in new 
federal courts); Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, 
Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW. & 
HIST. REV. 223 (1986); Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. 
Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendency, and the Abolition of Federal 
Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919 (1992). 
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this, those who made nomination recommendations knew that 
those nominated would represent the interests of the United 
States. 
While state practice served as the model for the Judiciary 
Act and Congress identified the new United States Attorneys as 
judicial officers, Congress debated who would appoint these 
attorneys.124  Initial drafts granted the Supreme Court 
appointment power.125  Later, Congress changed the provision, 
giving it to the President with the Senate’s advice and 
consent.126  While this might indicate a desire to make the 
District Attorneys executive officials, the judges were subject to 
the same process. 
On September 24, 1789, Washington signed the Judiciary 
Act and sent most of his nominees to the Senate for its 
consent.127  Among these nominees was Virginia’s Edmund 
Randolph as Attorney General.128  Four days later, Washington 
wrote Randolph informing Randolph of the appointment and 
expressing Washington’s desire that Randolph accept it.129  
Washington began by defining the characteristics he hoped 
those in the judiciary would possess, writing, “the selection of 
the fittest characters to expound the laws, and dispense justice, 
has been an invariable object of my anxious concern.”130  
Removed from its context, this seemingly refers to judges.  
However, Washington then wrote, “I mean not to flatter when I 
say that considerations like these have ruled in the nomination 
of the Attorney-General of the United States &, that my private 
wishes wd [sic] be highly gratified by yr [sic] accepte [sic] of the 
 
124.  Warren, supra note 108, at 108–09. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. 
127.  See Primary Documents in American History: Judiciary Act of 1789, 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ 
ourdocs/judiciary.html (discussing the date Washington signed the Judiciary 
Act); see also Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. 
Senate (Sept. 24, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/ 
05-04-02-0053) (listing Washington’s nominees). 
128.  Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate, supra note 127. 
129.  Letter from George Washington to Edmund Randolph, supra note 1 
(noting that interestingly, Washington nominated, and the Senate confirmed, 
many of Washington’s nominees prior to informing the nominee of the 
nomination). 
130.  Id. 
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Office . . . .”131  With these words, Washington indicated that the 
United States’ legal representatives were as much judicial 
figures as judges. 
By nominating his attorneys, Wahsington demonstrated 
that he considered them part of the judiciary.  When Washington 
nominated United States Attorneys, he did so at the same time 
as judicial appointments.132  For each judicial district, 
Washington nominated a judge, an attorney, and a marshal, all 
of whom served the court.133  He also nominated the Supreme 
Court Justices and Attorney General.134 
Compared to those with whom they were nominated, the 
United States Attorney position was not prestigious and was 
considered, at best, a second-rate position.  The most reputable 
attorneys sought and filled Congressional and Supreme Court 
positions.  Of the ninety-five men who served in the first 
Congress, forty-three had formal legal training and 
backgrounds,135 two became presidents,136 one temporarily 
became the Supreme Court’s third Chief Justice and another 
would serve on the Court,137 one was a president of the 
Continental Congress,138 and four had signed either the 
Declaration of Independence or the United States 
 
131.  Id. 
132.  Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate, supra note 127; 
see also Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate 
(Sept. 25, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-
02-0058. 
133.  Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate, supra note 127. 
134.  Id. 
135.  See generally BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
136.  Madison, James, Jr., (1751 - 1836), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. 
CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000043 (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2018); Monroe, James, (1758 - 1831), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY 
U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000858 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
137.  Ellsworth, Oliver, (1745 - 1807), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. 
CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000147 (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2018) (Oliver Ellsworth served as Chief Justice); Paterson, 
William, (1745 - 1806), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=P000102 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2018) (William Paterson served as an Associate Justice). 
138.  Boudinot, Elias, (1740 - 1821), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000661 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2018). 
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Constitution.139  Washington’s Supreme Court Justice 
appointments also included illustrious attorneys.140  Washington 
chose John Jay, a leader in the Continental Congress and writer 
of several Federalist Papers, to be Chief Justice.141  He also chose 
John Rutledge, who temporarily became the third Chief 
Justice.142  Rutledge had been a state governor and a delegate to 
the Constitutional Convention.143  James Wilson, also 
nominated to the Supreme Court, was a leading American legal 
scholar and played an important role in the Constitutional 
Convention.144 
Well respected attorneys not elected to Congress or 
appointed to the Supreme Court hoped for federal district court 
judgeships.  During the summer of 1789, once certain there 
would be lower federal courts, people began sending Washington 
 
139.  Clymer, George, (1739 - 1813), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG.,  
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000538 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2018); Morris, Robert, (1734 - 1806), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. 
CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000985 (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2018); Read, George, (1733 - 1798), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY 
U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000091 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2018); Sherman, Roger, (1721 - 1793), BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000349 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2018).  
140.  See generally Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 
2018) (showing Washington selected John Jay as Chief Justice and John 
Rutledge, William Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, and James Iredell as 
the Associate Justices).   
141.  WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE 
CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 54 (Univ. of S.C. Press 
1995); see generally Sandra Frances VanBurkleo, “Honor, Justice, and 
Interest:” John Jay’s Republican Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal 
Bench, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 29 (Scott 
Douglas Gerber ed., N.Y.U. Press 1998). 
142.  CASTO, supra note 141, at 54. 
143.  James Haw, John Rutledge: Distinction and Declension, in SERIATIM: 
THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 71 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 
N.Y.U. Press 1998); see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 18, at 526–27. 
(explaining that Rutledge was nominated, but was not confirmed due to his 
opposition to the Jay Treaty). 
144.  CASTO, supra note 141, at 54; Mark D. Hall, James Wilson: 
Democratic Theorist and Supreme Court Justice, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME 
COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 126–28 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., N.Y.U. Press 
1988). 
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judicial recommendations.145  Not knowing the legal community 
in these states, Washington accepted the recommendations, as 
most came from the state’s congressional delegation.146  
Recommenders usually ranked candidates.147  The first person 
listed was the federal judge recommendation and the others 
became candidates for the United States Attorney position.148  
Thus, the pool of potential district attorneys was limited to those 
not selected for Congress, the Supreme Court, or the federal 
bench. 
Another limiting factor was the position’s financial 
compensation.  The job of a United States attorney was a part-
time position, as the United States government was one of many 
clients.149  United States Attorneys received a fee for each case 
they pursued.150  While this incentivized filing cases, some 
United States Attorneys were less inclined to act and later 
submitted bills for services rendered for work unrelated to a 
court case.151  Future Supreme Court Chief Justice John 
Marshall was one of Washington’s initial appointments.152  
Marshall declined the appointment, however, citing his 
significant state-court practice.153  This shows that Marshall, 
who would become a staunch Federalist, did not believe the 
federal courts and the position’s compensation were worth his 
time. 
 
145.  See, e.g., Letter from Arthur Lee to George Washington, supra note 
114; Letter from Benjamin Nicholson to George Washington, supra note 114, 
at n.1. 
146.  See infra IV(A). 
147.  Id. 
148.  See, e.g., Letter from Jeremiah Wadsworth, Member, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State (Feb. 22, 1791), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-19-02-0103-0003. 
149.  Symposium, The Office of U.S. Attorney and Public Safety: A Brief 
History Prepared for the “Changing Role of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in Public 
Safety,” 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 753, 755–56 (2000). 
150.  EISENSTEIN, supra note 64, at 9–10; NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST 
THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-
1940, at 257 (Yale Univ. Press 2013). 
151.  See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Randolph, U.S. Sec’y of State, to 
Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury Jul. 2, 1794), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/. 
152.  Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate, supra note 127. 
153.  Letter from John Marshall to George Washington, U.S. President 
(Oct. 14, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/. 
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B. Types of “Politics” When Hiring 
 
President George Washington began to experience partisan 
turbulence similar to today’s political atmosphere.  Unlike 
today’s deeply entrenched allegiances, partisan political 
alliances formed and mutated during Washington’s presidency.  
Hoping to stay above the political fragmentation, Washington 
navigated these changes to fulfill his particular political 
objectives.154  The first divide Washington encountered arose 
between the Constitution’s supporters and detractors.155  Once 
the federal government began operating, its detractors turned to 
constitutional interpretation.156  Republicans pushed for a strict, 
narrow interpretation, along with some who favored the 
Constitution, giving the federal government little authority 
beyond the Constitution’s specific wording.157  Their opponents 
favored a more expansive constitutional interpretation that gave 
the federal government powers implied in the constitution’s 
wording.158 
Having served as the Constitutional Convention’s presiding 
officer, Washington identified with Constitutional federalists, or 
those who supported ratifying the new Constitution.159  He had 
agreed to serve this function because his experience as the 
Continental Army’s Commander-in-Chief gave him a national 
perspective.160  His post-war commercial business interests 
required interstate commerce and he understood the need for 
 
154.  JOHN FERLING, THE ASCENT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: THE HIDDEN 
POLITICAL GENIUS OF AN AMERICAN ICON xix–xxi (Bloomsbury Press 2009). 
155.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1st ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2016); PAULINE 
MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (1st 
ed. Simon & Schuster 2010). 
156.  JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: 
THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS 8-10 (Yale Univ. Press 1993); see generally Lance 
Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 
1793, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 167 (Omohundro Inst. of Early Am. Hist. & Culture 
1974). 
157.  CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 155–56 (Maeva 
Marcus et al. eds, Cambridge Univ. Press 1st ed. 2008). 
158.  Id. at 150–51. 
159.  FERLING, supra note 154, at 267–68. 
160.  Id. at 262–67. 
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national regulation, a power the Articles of Confederation 
lacked.161  However, Washington also knew that the anti-
federalists feared a centralized national government and 
identified themselves more closely with their respective 
states.162  His appointments had to balance these interests.163  
He sought people with strong local reputations who also 
supported the new national government.164  Therefore, 
Washington chose constitutional federalists with his initial 
government personnel selections. 
This initial divide did not last long as the Constitution’s 
opponents quickly accepted its legitimacy.165  Unity did not 
result, however, as competing constitutional interpretations 
emerged,166 most noticeably from within Washington’s 
administration.167  Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton led 
the Federalists, or those supporting an expansive constitutional 
interpretation.168  Meanwhile, Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson led the opposition to Hamilton’s centralization of 
executive branch power.169  Washington generally sided with 
Hamiltonian Federalists.170  Hamilton served Washington 
during the Revolutionary War and, despite some differences, 
Washington supported Hamilton’s philosophy.171  Consistent 
 
161.  Id. at 258–61. 
162.  Id. at 270–73; see also GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A 
HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 75–76 (David M. Kennedy ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
163.  DAVID S. HEIDLER & JEANNE T. HEIDLER, WASHINGTON’S CIRCLE: THE 
CREATION OF THE PRESIDENT loc. 1342–1346 (Random House Publ’g Grp. 2015) 
(ebook). 
164.  WOOD, supra note 162, at 106–10. 
165.  Banning, supra note 156, at 168–69. 
166.  FRITZ, supra note 157, at 150–55. 
167.  ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 18, at 18–28 (describing the 
ideological differences between Jefferson and Hamilton); JOHN FERLING, 
JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE RIVALRY THAT FORGED A NATION 213–15 
(Bloomsbury Press 2013) (explaining how Hamilton’s idea for a Bank of the 
United States triggered Jefferson and Hamilton divide). 
168.  RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 388–95 (Penguin Press 2004). 
169.  Id.; LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 45–49 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004); 
FERLING, supra note 167, at 214–18; SHARP, supra note 156, at 40–42; WOOD, 
supra note 162, at 144–47. 
170.  CHERNOW, supra note 168, at 395. 
171.  FERLING, supra note 154, at 282–84. 
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with these preferences, Washington’s later United States 
Attorney appointments aligned with Hamiltonian Federalists to 
ensure enforcement of Hamilton’s legislative agenda.172 
 
IV. The Process, the Prosecutors, and Politicization 
 
Against these political backdrops, Washington made his 
initial attorney selections and, as time passed, selected 
replacements when necessary.  To make each appointment, 
Washington relied upon others in the government and others he 
trusted to provide recommendations.  Following these 
recommendations, Washington would select someone and then 
send the nomination to the Senate.  His selections shared certain 
characteristics, especially in terms of age, experience, and 
personal connections.  These similarities resulted in a group 
loyal to Washington and his policies.173 
 
A. Process 
 
Even before George Washington assumed the Presidency, 
those hoping to work for the new federal government wrote 
seeking appointment, mostly for Treasury and public works 
positions.174  Nearly all involved Treasury and public works 
positions.175  There were more jobs and more applicants than 
people whom Washington knew.176  This required Washington to 
rely upon other’s recommendations.  Reputation played a 
particularly important role;177 it equated to political currency.178  
Knowing that the fittest characters were necessary for the 
judiciary to earn its desired respect, Washington utilized a 
 
172.  See infra notes 366–396 and accompanying text. 
173.  See Scott Ingram, Representing the United States Government: 
Reconceiving the Federal Prosecutor’s Role Through a Historical Lens, 31 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 293 (2017). 
174.  See, e.g., Letter from Lachlan McIntosh, General, to George 
Washington, U.S. President (Feb. 14, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-01-02-0223. 
175.  WOOD, supra note 162, at 108–109. 
176.  Id. at 108–09. 
177.  JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE 
NEW REPUBLIC xx-xxi (Yale Univ. Press 2001). 
178.  Id. 
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similar process whereby he sought recommendations from 
people he knew.179 
On September 24th and 25th, Washington nominated 
thirteen United  States Attorneys,  the Attorney General, and  
all federal judges.180  The Senate  confirmed each  appointment  
on the 26th.181  Washington would appoint twenty more people 
as United States Attorneys during the next eight years.182  All 
 
179.  See, e.g., Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to James 
McHenry (Aug. 13, 1792),  
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-10-02-0436. 
180.  See Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate, supra note 
127; see also Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate, supra note 
132.  The thirteen U.S. Attorneys were as follows: 
 
Name State 
Age at 
Appointment 
Years of 
Experience 
Years in 
Office 
Christopher Gore Massachusetts 31 11 7 
William Lithgow Maine 41 17 4 
John Samuel 
Sherburne 
New 
Hampshire 
32 13 4 
Pierpont Edwards Connecticut 39 18 17 
William Lewis Pennsylvania 37 16 2 
George Read, Jr. Delaware 24 4 26 
Richard Potts Maryland 36 14 2 
John Marshall Virginia 34 9 0 
John Julius 
Pringle 
South Carolina 36 8 3 
Matthew 
McAllister 
Georgia 31 6 7 
George Nicholas Kentucky 35 n/a 2 
Richard Harison New York 42 6* 12 
Richard Stockton New Jersey 25 2 2 
 
*Does not count years of experience prior to Declaration of Independence. 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U. S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/ 
biosearch.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Initial United States 
Attorney Table]. 
181.  1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29 (Duff Green 1828) (1789), 
https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llej&fileName=001/llej001.db& 
recNum=35&itemLink=?%230010036&linkText=1 [hereinafter Senate 
Executive Journal]. 
182.  The table below lists those who Washington nominated for United 
States Attorney throughout the remainder of his tenure in office: 
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but three replaced one of Washington’s initial appointments.  In 
each instance, like Washington’s initial appointments, the 
Senate confirmed the nominees quickly.183 
 
Name State 
Age at 
Appointment 
Years of 
Experience 
Years in 
Office 
John Sitgreaves* North Carolina 33 12 0 
William 
Channing* 
Rhode Island 39 19 3 
Stephen Jacobs* Vermont 36 10 3 
John Davis Massachusetts 35 10 5 
Daniel Davis Maine 34 n/a 5 
Edwards St. Loe 
Livermore 
New Hampshire 32 11 3 
William Rawle Pennsylvania 32 8 10 
Zebulon 
Hollingsworth 
Maryland 30 n/a 14 
William Nelson, 
Jr. 
Virginia 36 n/a 1 
Thomas Parker South Carolina 32 7 28 
Charles Jackson Georgia 29 n/a 1 
William Murray Kentucky n/a n/a 1 
Abraham Ogden New Jersey 48 23 7 
William Hill North Carolina 24 n/a 4 
Ray Greene Rhode Island 29 8 3 
Amos Marsh Vermont 30 n/a 2 
Alexander 
Campbell 
Virginia 28 n/a 5 
George 
Woodruff 
Georgia 33 10 4 
Benjamin 
Woods 
North Carolina n/a n/a 13 
Thomas Nelson Virginia 32 n/a 7 
 
*Although listed with replacements, these attorneys were the first for their 
state.  Their states did not ratify the Constitution until after Washington made 
his initial appointments. 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U. S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/ 
biosearch.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Replacement United 
States Attorney Table] 
183.  See JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 181 
(stating that all of Washington’s nominees were confirmed within one week of 
nomination and most were within one to two days following nomination).  
While Professor Friedland asserts that this shows the Senate did not provide 
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
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One of the first recommendations Washington received 
came from George Thacher, an attorney and Congressman from 
Maine.184  Thatcher sided with the Federalists and remained in 
Congress until 1801.185  Thatcher wrote Washington on 
September 14th, 1789 saying: 
 
I take the liberty of handing to you the names of 
two Gentlemen either of whom in my opinion will 
make a respectable District Judge for the District 
of Maine—viz. the Honourable David Sewal & 
William Lithgow Junr. The former was appointed 
one of the Judges of the Supreme Judicial Court, 
for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, about 
the year 1776—which office he has sustained to 
the present time—He lives at York in the District 
of Maine. 
The latter is a respectable Attorney at Law of 
about thirteen years standing he lives at Hollowel 
on Kennebeck River[.] He served four or five years 
in the Army—where he lost the use of his right 
arm by a ball he received [sic] in an engagement 
with the enemy—He is now Major General of the 
Militia in the eastern Division of Massachusetts. 
Should the former be appointed Judge in Maine 
District—the latter appears to me the most 
suitable person in that District for the Attorney to 
the United States in the said District—But if the 
latter be appointed Judge, I wish to mention 
Daniel Davis of Portland as a suitable person for 
the Attorney in that District.186 
 
 
a significant check on Washington’s appointments, this misses the informal 
role members of Congress played in Washington’s appointments.  Friedland, 
supra note 80, at 181–82. 
184.  Thacher, George, (1754 - 1824), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U. S. 
CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000141 (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
185.  Id. 
186.  Letter from George Thacher to George Washington, U.S. President 
(Sept. 14, 1789), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-
02-0021 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original). 
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Washington followed Thacher’s advice and appointed 
Sewall as judge and Lithgow as attorney.187  This demonstrates 
the role advise and consent played in the selection process.  
Washington made only one visit to Maine and likely knew little 
about its legal community.188  Therefore, Washington relied on 
those familiar it.  No one else in Congress would be familiar with 
Maine’s legal community because, at that time, it was a District 
within Massachusetts;189 Maine did not have its own senator.  
Therefore, no one in Congress could credibly question Thatcher’s 
judgment. There was no need for further inquiry; they trusted 
their colleague’s judgment. 
North Carolina provides another example of Washington’s 
consultations prior to making an appointment.  When North 
Carolina ratified the Constitution in the fall of 1789, it meant 
Washington had more positions to fill.190  He received 
recommendations from as many of the North Carolina 
Congressional delegation as would provide them.  Four North 
Carolina Representatives provided advice,191 but no Senator 
did.192  When the recommendations arrived, Washington tasked 
 
187.  Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate, supra note 127. 
188.  See FERLING, supra note 154, at 287 (noting that just before making 
his nominations, Washington journeyed to the New England states reaching 
as far north as Kittery, Maine, his journey taking him a month to complete, 
which did not give him significant time in any one place). 
189.  MAIER, supra note 155, at 161–62 (discussing Maine as part of the 
Massachusetts constitutional ratification convention). 
190.  MAIER, supra note 155, at 457–58; Albert Ray Newsome, North 
Carolina’s Ratification of the Federal Constitution, 17 N. C. HIST. REV. 287, 299 
(1940). 
191.  See Letter from Timothy Bloodworth, Member, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to George Washington, U.S. President (June 5, 1790), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0300 
(explaining that Representatives Steele, Ashe, Bloodworth, and Williamson 
submitted recommendations for the judgeship, with only Ashe and Bloodworth 
including people for United States Attorney); see also Letter from John B. Ashe 
to George Washington, U.S. President (June 5, 1790), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0298. 
192.  North Carolina’s Senators were Benjamin Hawkins and Samuel 
Johnston.  See Hawkins, Benjamin, (1754 - 1816), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U. 
S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000368 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2018); Johnston, Samuel, (1733 - 1816), BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY U. S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl? 
index=J000198 (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
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Jefferson with summarizing them.193  Four United States 
Attorney candidates emerged.194  Representative Timothy 
Bloodworth, an anti-Federalist during ratification but elected to 
serve in the First Congress, recommended four people, more 
than any other recommender.195  His list included the eventual 
nominee, John Sitgreaves, whom John Ashe also mentioned.196  
Ashe had served as chair of North Carolina’s ratification 
convention, but was opposed to the Administration.197  When 
Jefferson collected the names, he consulted one of North 
Carolina’s Senators, Benjamin Hawkins, for his thoughts on the 
candidates.198  Hawkins served on Washington’s staff during the 
Revolutionary War and supported the Constitution’s 
ratification.199  According to Jefferson, Hawkins vouched for all 
candidates but one, who was under indictment for fraud.200  The 
others possessed good character but, of Sitgreaves, Hawkins 
said, “he is a gentlemanly man, & as good a lawyer as any 
there.”201  With that, plus Ashe’s concurrence and Bloodworth’s 
acquiescence, Sitgreaves received the nomination.202  This 
demonstrates that when Washington lacked knowledge about 
whom to appoint, he relied upon the State’s elected officials and 
deferred to their opinions while seeking consensus.  North 
 
193.  Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State, to George 
Washington, U.S. President (June 7, 1790), https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Jefferson/01-16-02-0274 (recommending candidates for federal 
offices in North Carolina and the Southwestern Government). 
194.  Id. 
195.  See Letter from Timothy Bloodworth to George Washington, supra 
note 191. 
196.  See Letter from John B. Ashe to George Washington, supra note 191. 
197.  Ashe, John Baptista, (1748 - 1802), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE 
U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=A000307 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2018); see also Letter from John B. Ashe to George 
Washington, supra note 191. 
198.  See Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 
supra note 193. 
199.  Hawkins, Benjamin, (1754 - 1816), supra note 192. 
200.  See Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State, to 
George Washington, U.S. President (June 7, 1790), http://founders.archives. 
gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0304. 
201.  Id. 
202.  See Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. 
Senate (June 7, 1790), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/ 
05-05-02-0306. 
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Carolina also provides evidence that Washington relied more 
upon those who shared his views than those who did not.  While 
Bloodworth names Sitgreaves, the nomination was not made 
until Hawkins lent his support. 
 
B. Salient Nominee Characteristics 
 
At least twenty-six pieces of correspondence remain 
discussing United States Attorney nominees.  While Washington 
wrote a few, most were sent to the Administration providing 
attorney recommendations.  These letters provide insight into 
the characteristics Washington and the recommenders 
considered most salient.  Anyone recommended to Washington 
had to meet the statutory requirements, so it is not surprising 
that legal and character factors were most common.  Legal 
factors appeared in all twenty-six recommendations and 
character in twenty. 
Three different legal factors emerged: (1) legal knowledge, 
(2) talent, and (3) experience.  Rarely, however, did they provide 
detail about the factors.  For example, in the summer of 1792, 
Maryland’s United States Attorney resigned, forcing the 
Administration to select a replacement.203  William Vans Murry, 
an attorney and Congressman from Maryland aligned with the 
Hamilton Federalists, recommended the person Washington 
selected saying, “[a] long acquaintance with him enables to say 
that he is a man of integrity; & I conceive of parts exceedingly 
brilliant, with a knowledge of his profession which has raised his 
consequence at the bar . . . .”204  In Rhode Island, where 
appointments were hotly contested, the nominee for District 
Judge wrote Vice President Adam about the eventual nominee, 
“I do not know where are [sic] Atty for the District can be found 
so worthy of Attention as Mr. Wm. Channing:—In extensive 
Practice and Law Knowledge scarcely equalled, inferior to 
none—His Name & Family will be well known to the President 
 
203.  See Letter from Richard Potts, Chief Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit, 
to George Washington, U.S. President (June 12, 1792), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-10-02-0299. 
204.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to James McHenry, 
supra note 179.  
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
ARTICLE 4_INGRAM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2019  7:42 PM 
2018 GEORGE WASHINGTON’S ATTORNEYS 197 
upon recollection . . . .”205  Channing, who had served as Rhode 
Island Attorney General, exemplifies the importance of 
experience with knowledge.206  Finally, Congressman Ashe’s 
recommendation of Sitgreaves as United States Attorney for 
North Carolina revealed the distinction between legal 
experience and ability.207  Ashe said Sitgreaves, “has [practiced] 
the Law for some years past in No. Carolina, tho’ [sic] not so 
brilliant in abilities, Stands as a favorably as to rectitude of 
mind, as any of his profession.”208  While Ashe and others 
distinguished, Washington apparently did not. 
Legal experience also played a key role.  Washington’s 
selections averaged eleven years of experience prior to selection.  
Of Washington’s initial nominees, only four had less than ten 
years’ experience.  Two had eight and nine years respectively.  
The other two—Delaware’s George Read and New Jersey’s 
Richard Stockton—had four and five years.209  As for the 
replacements, less is known about their prior experience.  
Thomas Parker of South Carolina entered office with the least 
experience (seven years), but he remained for twenty-eight 
years, the longest tenure of any Washington appointee.210  At the 
other end, Abraham Ogden, who quickly replaced Stockton in 
New Jersey, had twenty-three years of experience when he 
assumed the role, the most of any Washington nominee.211  In 
 
205.  Letter from Henry Marchant, Dist. Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the 
Dist. of R.I., to John Adams, U.S. Vice President (June 7, 1790), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-0976. 
206.  See Letter from William Channing to George Washington, U.S. 
President (June 8, 1790), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/05-05-02-0307. 
207.  See Letter from John B. Ashe to George Washington, supra note 191.  
208.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
209.  Christian Gullager, Office History: A Rich History of Public Service, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: U.S. ATT’YS OFF., DISTRICT OF N.J., https://www.justice.gov/ 
usao-nj/about/office-history (last updated May 8, 2018) [hereinafter Read, Jr.]; 
Jim Meek, George Read, Jr. (1765-1836), NEW CASTLE, DEL. COMMUNITY HIST. 
& ARCHAEOLOGY PROGRAM, http://nc-chap.org/portraits/ 
details.php?wname=george_read_jr_wertmuller (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).  
210.  See Letter from Tobias Lear to Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State 
(Oct. 26 1792), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-11-02-
0146. 
211.  WILLIAM OGDEN WHEELER, THE OGDEN FAMILY IN AMERICA: 
ELIZABETHTOWN BRANCH AND THEIR ENGLISH ANCESTRY: JOHN OGDEN, THE 
PILGRIM AND HIS DESCENDANTS 1640-1906, at 103–04 (Lawrence Van Alstyne 
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total, all of Washington’s nominees, with the possible exceptions 
of Read and Stockton, practiced long enough to establish legal 
reputations. 
Character played a part in twenty of the twenty-six 
recommendations.  Several different traits emerged.  Some 
spoke of character generally.  When Congressman Timothy 
Bloodworth recommended Sitgreaves, he wrote, “[Sitgreaves] is 
a gentleman of [c]arrecter [sic] & represented the State in 
Congress in the [y]ear 1785.”212  Others provided more detail.  
For example, Ashe referred to Sitgreaves as having “rectitude of 
mind,” meaning that he did what was proper.213  In Georgia, 
Washington’s eventual nominee for District Judge, Nathaniel 
Pendleton, wrote to Washington recommending Matthew 
McAllister as the United States Attorney.214  Pendleton referred 
to McAllister as “a man of [s]trickt [sic] honor and [i]ntegrity . . . 
very well qualified to fulfil [sic] the duties of the [o]ffice he 
solicits if he should be appointed to it.”215  Washington used this 
information to conclude his appointees were meet people, 
learned in the law. 
 
C. Politicization 
 
While legal training and character were the statutory 
requirements, Washington did not select people on this basis 
alone.  Instead, he selected people based on their politics.  First 
and foremost, these were political patronage positions.  Nearly 
every person selected had served Washington or had a close 
connection to the recommender.  Able lawyers were not selected 
because they lacked the requisite connections.  Second, those 
Washington selected matched Washington’s policy goals.  If 
there was no evidence that they supported the Constitution prior 
to ratification or had not demonstrated loyalty to the Republic 
 
& Charles Burr Ogden eds., J.B. Lippincott Co. Phila. 1907).  
212. Letter from Timothy Bloodworth to George Washington, supra note 
191. 
213.  Letter from John B. Ashe to George Washington, supra note 191. 
214.  See Letter from Matthew McAllister to George Washington, U.S. 
President (Aug. 26, 1789), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/05-03-02-0318.  
215.  Id. 
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in some other manner, then Washington did not select them.  
Finally, and while not the case in every instance, many of 
Washington’s nominees supported Washington’s partisan 
interests.  They were loyal Federalists. 
 
1. Patronage 
 
Nearly every person Washington appointed as a United 
States Attorney was a political patronage position.216  They had 
a direct connection to Washington or were one step removed 
from him so that a trusted recommender identified them.  Those 
whom Washington knew either came from prominent families or 
had served the Revolution.  Among the patronage selections, two 
were most obvious: Delaware’s George Read and New Jersey’s 
Richard Stockton.  Both were among Washington’s first 
nominees, had less legal experience than any other nominee, and 
were the youngest of any Washington nominee.217  They shared 
one other common trait: their fathers were two of only six people 
who signed both the United States Declaration of Independence 
and the United States Constitution.218  Having nothing else 
merit their selection, their selection was clearly a reward for 
their fathers’ loyalty and service.219 
 
216.  See generally Domonic A. Bearfield, What Is Patronage? A Critical 
Reexamination, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 64, 68–69 (2009) (Patronage has a variety 
of meanings.  At minimum, it involves a relationship between people with 
unequal status who participate in an exchange relationship and is anchored 
only loosely to law or norms.  Bearfield identifies four patronage styles.  
Organizational patronage strengthens or creates political organizations.  
Democratic patronage uses patronage to achieve democratic goals.  Tactical 
patronage uses public offices to achieve political or policy goals.  Finally, reform 
patronage uses public offices as a means to replace the disfavored previous 
regime.  At the time Washington made his appointments, patronage meant the 
selection of close family members to important positions in order to maintain 
power.); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 18, at 52–55.  For purposes of this 
article, patronage refers to the more modern conception. 
217.  See Read, Jr., supra note 209; see also Stockton, Richard, (1764 - 
1828), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/ 
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000941 (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).   
218.  Read, George, (1733 - 1798), supra note 139; see also Frederick 
Bernays Wiener, The Signer Who Recanted, 26 AM. HERITAGE (1975), 
http://www.americanheritage.com/content/signer-who-recanted. 
219.  Despite their similarities, their service as United States District 
Attorneys differed substantially.  Read went on to become one of the longest 
serving United States Attorneys while Stockton remained only one year  See 
37
ARTICLE 4_INGRAM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2019  7:42 PM 
200 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.1 
For several other nominees, Washington utilized his 
professional and personal knowledge.  One, John Davis of 
Massachusetts, served in the Treasury Department during 
Washington’s presidency220 and another, Daniel Davis of Maine, 
served as de facto United States Attorney when William Lithgow 
could not.221  Two nominees served in the Revolutionary War: 
Lithgow and North Carolina’s John Sitgreaves.222  While neither 
fought under Washington’s direct command, both demonstrated 
their loyalty.  Lithgow’s service cost him the use of one arm.223  
Others did not fight in the war, but provided assistance.  New 
Jersey’s Abraham Ogden lent his  residence to Washington’s 
army  following  the Battle of  Princeton.224  William Channing,  
Rhode Island’s first United States Attorney, had assisted 
Washington in 1781.225 
Those whom George Washington did not know had well-
established political connections that aided their nominations.  
Several had connections to Administration members.  Richard 
 
supra note 181 and accompanying text.  Of the two, Stockton would have the 
more noteworthy legal career.  Read became a Chief Justice for Delaware until 
his death in 1798.  The Founding Fathers: Delaware, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers-delaware (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2019).  Stockton would later serve as a Senator and 
Congressman from New Jersey.  See The Election Case of John P. Stockton of 
New Jersey (1866), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/common/contested_elections/047John_Stockton.htm (last visited Feb. 
12, 2019); see also Stockton, Richard, (1764 - 1828), supra note 217. 
220.  Davis, John, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/node/1379836 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
221.  See Letter from Meletiah Jordan to Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y 
of the Treasury (Oct. 1, 1794), https://founders.archives.gov/documents 
/Hamilton/01-17-02-0274; Letter from Timothy Pickering, U.S. Sec’y of State 
to George Washington, U.S. President (Aug, 22, 1796), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-00875. 
222.  See Letter from William Lithgow, Jr. to George Washington, U.S. 
President (July 20, 1796), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/99-01-02-00753; Letter from George Thacher to George 
Washington, supra note 186; Letter from Benjamin Hawkins, U.S. Senator, to 
George Washington, U.S. President (Nov. 4, 1790, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-06-02-0292. 
223.  See John Francis Sprague (Ed.), Sprague’s Journal of Maine History 
(Vol. XIV, No. 3), ME. COLLECTION 31 (1926). 
224.  WHEELER, supra note 211, at 103–04. 
225.  See Letter from George Washington, Officer, U.S. Army, to William 
Channing (June 7, 1783), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/99-01-02-11394. 
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Harrison, who received the appointment for New York, worked 
closely with Alexander Hamilton in the matter of Vermont 
independence and New York’s Constitution ratification 
convention.226  John Julius Pringle received South Carolina’s 
first United States Attorney nomination.227  During the 
Revolution, he studied law in London then left for France, 
becoming the United States consul for France Ralph Izard’s 
personal secretary.228  While in France, Pringle volunteered to 
meet with the British and negotiate the release of captured 
American seamen.229  The selection committee, on which future 
Vice-President John Adams served, chose Pringle.230  Back in the 
United States, Pringle studied law under one of Washington’s 
initial United States Supreme Court nominees.231  Kentucky’s 
first nominee, George Nicholas, knew James Madison well, who, 
at that time, was one of Washington’s closest advisors.232  
Nicholas played a key role in Virginia’s ratification debates and 
 
226.  See Memorandum from N.Y. Assembly on An Act Acknowledging the 
Independence of Vermont nn. 1–2 (Mar. 28, 1787), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0067); see also 
Francis Childs, First Speech at the New York Ratifying Convention n. 1 (June 
23, 1788), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-05-02-0012-
0019. 
227.  See Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate, supra note 
127. 
228.  Letter from John Julius Pringle to Benjamin Franklin, U.S. Comm’r, 
et al. (Feb. 9, 1779), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-07-02-
0257; see also Letter from Benjamin Franklin, U.S. Comm’r to John Ross (Apr. 
26, 1778), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-26-02-0295 
(describing Pringle’s service to Izard); My Ancestors: Harris, Williams, Betts, 
Sappington, Mullican, Wiley, Stout & Crocker & Other Families, Roots Web, 
https://wc.rootsweb.ancestry.com/cgi-
bin/igm.cgi?op=GET&db=catherineburr357&id=I34258 (last visited Nov. 6, 
2018) [hereinafter My Ancestors] (displaying Pringle’s biography). 
229.  Letter from John Julius Pringle to Benjamin Franklin et al., supra 
note 228. 
230.  Id. at n.1. 
231.  My Ancestors, supra note 228. 
232.  Letter from Robert Carter Nicholas, Member, Va. Gen. Assembly, to 
George Washington, Officer, U.S. Army n.1 (Feb. 20, 1777), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-08-02-0422; George 
Nicholas (ca. 1754–1799), EDUC. @ LIBR. OF VA., http://edu.lva.virginia.gov/ 
online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/people/george_nicholas (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2018); see HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 163, at 1239–47 
(discussing Madison’s relationship as Washington’s Prime Minister at this 
time). 
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in Kentucky’s statehood movement.233 
Pennsylvania’s two United States Attorneys during 
Washington’s Administration demonstrated the importance of 
political connections.  The first nominee was William Lewis, a 
Quaker who studied law under a prominent Quaker attorney in 
Philadelphia.234  When Lewis earned his bar admission, his 
teacher retired, leaving his practice to Lewis.235  This gave Lewis 
the freedom to represent causes that were important to him, 
including representing Quakers accused of treason in the years 
immediately following independence.236  This work connected 
him with James Wilson, one of six people to sign both the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.237  Wilson 
was a leading legal scholar when Washington nominated him to 
the Supreme Court.238  While no record remains, Wilson likely 
recommended Lewis to Washington.  However, Lewis remained 
less than a year because Washington’s Pennsylvania District 
Court Judge appointee died, allowing Lewis to receive the 
district judge nomination.239 
 To replace Lewis, Washington nominated William Rawle.240  
Rawle was a Philadelphia native and Quaker who remained 
loyal to the British during the Revolution.241  He escaped to New 
York when the British abandoned Philadelphia.242  While in New 
York, Rawle studied law and then went to London for further 
legal study.243  In 1782, Rawle returned to Philadelphia and was 
later admitted to the bar in 1783.244  Rawle subsequently joined 
 
233.  George Nicholas (ca. 1754–1799), supra note 232. 
234.  GEORGE C. MCFARLAND, JR. ET AL., WILLIAM LEWIS, ESQUIRE: 
ENLIGHTENED STATESMAN, PROFOUND LAWYER, AND USEFUL CITIZEN 3 (Diane 
Publ’g Co. 2012). 
235.  Id. at 4. 
236.  Id. at 20–21. 
237.  Id. at 9–10; JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: 
HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 15–16 (Harvard Univ. Press 2007). 
238.  WITT, supra note 237, at 16. 
239.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate 
(Oct. 31, 1791), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-09-
02-0077). 
240.  Id. 
241.  Id. 
242.  Id. 
243.  Id. 
244.  Id. 
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the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, which connected Rawle to 
Lewis.245  When Rawle received his appointment, he noted he 
had not solicited it; someone else recommended Rawle to 
Washington.246  It is most likely that Lewis recommended Rawle.  
The two worked together closely prior to and after Rawle’s 
appointment.247 
Finally, New England politics influenced Washington’s 
selections.  Those recommended to Washington had to be on the 
“right” side of the state’s political alliances.  New Hampshire and 
Rhode Island proved the most contentious positions.  New 
Hampshire politics featured a battle between those living along 
the coast and those living inland.248  The groups advocated 
joining the new federal government but divided over who should 
serve in the government.249  At first, the coastal faction prevailed 
so Samuel Sherburne, a political operative for the coastal 
faction, received the initial appointment.250  This faction later 
opposed Administration policies.251 Sherburne remained in office 
until 1793 when he became a member of the United States 
House of Representatives.252  Edwards St. Loe Livermore, whose 
 
245.  See generally David C. Claypoole & John Dunlap, PA. PACKET & 
DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 23, 1790, at 2. 
246.  Journal Entry by William Rawle Sr., in RAWLE FAMILY PAPERS 
(Pennsylvania Historical Society 1791) (“Composed upon receiving the 
unsolicited Commission of Attorney for the United States”). 
247.  MCFARLAND, ET AL., supra note 234, at 36–37. 
248.  See LYNN WARREN TURNER, NINTH STATE: NEW HAMPSHIRE’S 
FORMATIVE YEARS 120 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1983) (discussing the Exeter Junto); 
see also J.M. Opal, The Politics of “Industry”: Federalism in Concord and 
Exeter, New Hampshire, 1790-1805, 20 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 637 (2000). 
249.  See TURNER, supra note 248, at 121, 142 (explaining the origins of 
the divide in New Hampshire, stating “[n]othing except vague and conflicting 
personal antagonisms divided the leaders of New Hampshire in 1792.  Within 
a few months, however, these men were to find themselves arrayed in hostile 
ranks under banners inscribed Federalist and Republican, fighting at the side 
of other men with whom, in many cases, they had exchanged heavy blows 
during the paper-money struggle or at the ratifying convention.”). 
250.  Id. at 103; Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate, supra 
note 127. 
251.  TURNER, supra note 248, at 143. 
252.  Letter from John Samuel Sherburne, Member, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to George Washington, U.S. President (Aug. 30, 1793), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0393; 
Sherburne, John Samuel, (1757 - 1830), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000339 (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2018). 
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father was a prominent New Hampshire judge from the inland 
faction, replaced Sherburne.253  This group adhered to the 
Washington Administration’s political positions.254 
Rhode Island politics revolved around commerce because of 
its two major ports, Providence and Newport,255 each of which 
had its own faction.256  The two factions sought consensus 
selections for federal appointments.257  If one person aligned too 
closely with one side, then that person was eliminated from 
consideration.258  When William Channing, Rhode Island’s first 
 
253.  TURNER, supra note 248, at 160–162; Letter from George 
Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate (Feb. 14, 1794), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-15-02-0177; Letter 
from Samuel Livermore, U.S. Senator, to Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State 
(Dec. 4, 1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-27-02-
0449. 
254.  TURNER, supra note 248, at 143. 
255.  JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS; CRITICS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION,1781-1788, at 52–54 (Van Rees Press 1961). 
256.  Id. 
257.  Id. 
258.  William Ellery, Newport’s Customs Collector, responded to 
Hamilton’s request for recommendations on who should replace William 
Channing.  Letter from William Ellery to Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of 
the Treasury (Dec. 16, 1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Hamilton/01-15-02-0385.  Ellery excluded David Howell and David Barnes, 
based on their political biases. Ellery wrote:  
Formerly, by being a Colleague in Congress with Mr. Howell, 
I became well acquainted with him, but since that time I have 
not often seen him. He has for some years studied and 
practiced [sic] Law, and his professional knowledge may be 
competent to the business of District Attorney; but it is 
apprehended, if he should be appointed to that Office, and a 
dispute should arise between the United States and certain 
mercantile houses in Providence, his connections by 
marriage, and the patronage and encouragement he has 
received from them, might give him a biass to their side. In a 
similar case the Merchants in Newport might not hope to 
receive any favour from him. . . .  With Mr. Barnes I have but 
a slight acquaintance. He married into a respectable family 
in Providence where he resides; but it is not probable that he 
would be biased [sic] by his connections in that town to the 
disadvantage of the United States. . . .  But as this affair 
having assumed a party complexion, has suggested an 
inquiry, whether there may not be a third character 
competent, eligible, and who would not be liable to a similar 
difficulty, I would mention our Senator Bradford and our 
Representative Bourn, was I not informed that neither of 
them would accept the Office. There is a young Gentleman, 
42https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
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United States Attorney, died, a contentious debate arose over his 
replacement.259  One candidate, David Howell, promoted himself 
to Jefferson who, in turn, lobbied Washington to appoint 
Howell.260  Howell, a Providence law professor, also had support 
from some prominent local citizens.261  Howell’s political 
opponents proffered David Barnes, a Massachusetts attorney 
who relocated to Rhode Island.262  Rhode Island’s political 
factions finally settled on Ray Greene.263  In the 1780s, Greene’s 
father had been Rhode Island’s Governor.264  His mother had 
been a Correspondent with Ben Franklin.265  Greene was from 
Warwick, a neutral site between Providence and Newport.266  
With this background, he appeased everyone. 
 
2. Policy 
 
Washington entered office with particular policy goals.  One 
was to make the new federal government respected 
 
Mr. Ray Greene, who I think would be agreeable to both 
parties. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
259.  Letter from Theodore Foster, U.S. Senator, to George Washington, 
U.S. President (Oct. 3, 1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/05-14-02-0112. 
260.  Letter from David Howell to Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State 
(Oct. 4, 1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-27-02-
0196) (explaining that Jefferson would eventually appoint Howell as United 
States Attorney for Rhode Island in 1801); see also Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson, U.S. President to the U.S. Senate (Jan. 6, 1802), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-02-0183-0007.  
261.  Letter from Theodore Foster to George Washington, supra note 259; 
Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury n.1 (Nov. 20, 
1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-15-02-0325. 
262.  Letter from Henry Marchant, Dist. Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the 
Dist. of R.I., to Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury (Dec. 9, 1793), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-15-02-037. 
263.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate 
(Jan. 24, 1794), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-15-
02-0091. 
264.  Letter from Edmund Randolph, U.S. Sec’y of State, to George 
Washington, U.S. President n.4 (Jan. 11, 1794), https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-15-02-0047. 
265.  Id. 
266.  Letter from Henry Marchant to Alexander Hamilton, supra note 
262. 
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domestically.267  This meant establishing the federal 
government’s law enforcement authority.268  To accomplish this, 
Washington sought people who would enforce the laws, but also 
respect local sensibilities.269  The first nominees had strong 
connections to the newly ratified Constitution, especially if they 
lacked a political patron vouching for their loyalty.  Two key 
pieces of evidence demonstrate that Washington only selected 
those who favored nationhood.  First, most whom he initially 
selected served at their State’s ratification convention and 
supported the Constitution.  Second, those whom Washington 
selected came of age during the independence movement, thus 
spending little of their life as colonists. 
Of Washington’s initial thirteen United States Attorney 
positions, four supported the Constitution at their respective 
state’s ratification convention.  Future Supreme Court Chief 
Justice John Marshall led the Constitution’s supporters at the 
contentious Virginia ratification convention.270  Likewise, 
Christopher Gore of Massachusetts was a vocal supporter who 
led the opposition to antifederalist John Hancock.271  In 
Connecticut, Pierrepont Edwards, the son of prominent minister 
Jonathan Edwards and uncle of Aaron Burr, had served in the 
Continental Congress and at the ratification convention.272  
Finally, Maryland’s Richard Potts supported the Constitution at 
Maryland’s convention.273 
 
267.  SHARP, supra note 156, at 17–27. 
268.  FRITZ, supra note 157, at 72–74, 79 (arguing the Administration’s 
response to the Whiskey Rebellion was based on a desire to assert and 
demonstrate the federal government’s law enforcement power); WOOD, supra 
note 162, at 72–74 (noting that the executive would be the energetic center of 
the government).  
269.  GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE MAKING 
OF THE AMERICAN STATE 1–6 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2016). 
270.  JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN 
MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES 44 (Riverhead Books 2018). 
271.  HELEN PINKNEY, CHRISTOPHER GORE, FEDERALIST OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, 1758-1827, at 22–27 (The Anthoensen Press 1969). 
272.  Charles A. Heckman, A Jeffersonian Lawyer and Judge in Federalist 
Connecticut: The Career of Pierpont Edwards, 28 CONN. L. REV. 669, 670–71 
(1996). 
273.  Edward C. Papenfuse et al., A Biographical Dictionary of the 
Maryland Legislature, 1635-1789, 426 ARCHIVES OF MD., 2002, at 658, 
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000426
/html/am426—658.html. 
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At least two of Washington’s subsequent appointees also 
served their state’s ratification conventions: John Sitgreaves 
and John Davis.  John Sitgreaves, North Carolina’s first 
nominee in 1790, supported ratification during North Carolina’s 
final convention.274  John Davis, who succeeded Gore in 
Massachusetts, also was a delegate to his state’s convention.275 
Support for the Constitution as a prerequisite clearly 
appears in the debate about Maryland’s second United States 
Attorney.  Two of Washington’s initial Maryland nominees did 
not accept their commissions.276  Potts, the United States 
Attorney nominee, delayed conveying his acceptance and 
ultimately resigned in 1792, citing the distance he lived from 
court.277  This forced Washington to find a replacement; 
Washington turned to James McHenry.278  McHenry responded, 
“[i]t is to be lamented that the best qualified man in the State is 
the last person who merits this appointment. I mean Mr. Luther 
Martin. Very few of his description have so far altered their 
principles as to be safely trusted with power.”279  Martin had 
been a delegate to Maryland’s ratification convention but left in 
protest and actively opposed ratification.280  McHenry clearly 
equates support for the Constitution with meriting 
appointment.  Those who did not support the Constitution could 
 
274.  Sitgreaves, John, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/ 
sitgreaves-john (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
275.  Davis, John, supra note 220. 
276.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to James McHenry, 
U.S. Sec’y of War (Nov. 30, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/05-04-02-0244 (explaining that Judge Harrison declined his 
Supreme Court nomination and Johnston declined his district judge position). 
277.  Id. (“I have no information of Mr [sic] Potts, the Attorney . . . having 
accepted their Commissions”); Letter from Richard Potts to George 
Washington, supra note 203. 
278.  Letter from James McHenry to George Washington, U.S. President 
(Aug. 16, 1792), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-11-02-
0002 (explaining that James McHenry served Washington during the 
Revolutionary War, represented Maryland at the Constitutional Convention, 
and would become Washington’s second Secretary of War); McHenry, James, 
(1753 - 1816), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U. S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress. 
gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000469 (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
279.  Letter from James McHenry to George Washington, supra note 278; 
see also MAIER, supra note 155, at 90–93 (regarding Luther Martin). 
280.  Letter from James McHenry to George Washington, supra note 278, 
at n.7. 
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not be entrusted to represent the federal government’s legal 
interests. 
Washington also used age as an indicator of loyalty to the 
nation, rather than the thirteen individual states.  Of 
Washington’s first thirteen United States Attorney nominees, 
only one was born prior to 1750.281  His nominees averaged 
thirty-three years old.282  This coincides with Washington’s 
cabinet selections.  Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, 
Attorney General Edmund Randolph and Secretary of War 
Henry Knox were also born in the 1750s.283  This becomes 
significant when related to the nation’s independence.  By the 
late 1760s and into the early 1770s, the colonists pushed toward 
independence.284  At that time, Washington’s eventual nominees 
were studying law and becoming adults.  They only knew the 
wish for independence and did not recall peaceful times as 
colonists.  By war’s end, they were solidifying their place in the 
new Nation’s political circles.  Therefore, national interests 
preceded state interests simply because the nominees better 
accepted the possibilities nationhood offered than the previous 
generation who lived peacefully as colonists during their 
formative years.  This trend continued with Washington’s 
replacement attorneys.  Only three were born outside the 1760s 
giving them even less colonial experience.285 
 
3. Partisanship 
 
While everyone accepted the newly-ratified Constitution, 
some who served in Congress opposed the Administration.286  
 
281.  See Initial United States Attorney Table, supra note 180. 
282.  Id. 
283.  NORTH CALLAHAN, HENRY KNOX: GENERAL WASHINGTON’S GENERAL 
16 (Reinhart 1958) (stating Knox was born in 1750); FERLING, supra note 167, 
at 11 (stating Hamilton was most likely born in 1755); JOHN J. REARDON, 
EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1974) (stating 
Randolph was born in 1753). 
284.  THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, INDEPENDENCE: THE TANGLED ROOTS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 157–58 (2014). 
285.  See Replacement United States Attorney Table, supra note 182. 
286.  The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress lists 28 
Congressmen as “Anti-administration” among those who served in the First 
Congress.  See generally BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., supra note 135.  
This is a fluid label, however, as it includes James Madison who did not oppose 
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Partisan fractures emerged over executive power.287  Within 
Washington’s Administration Hamilton and Jefferson clashed 
repeatedly.288  Washington tended to side with Hamilton, as the 
latter obtained an excise tax on whiskey and a pro-British 
version of neutrality.289  Hamilton needed people to enforce his 
political objectives: (1) establish the federal government’s power 
and (2) improve the nation’s economy.290  Therefore, supporting 
these objectives became a key selection criterion for Washington. 
Partisan selection also became more prominent because 
Washington could not devote as much time to filling federal 
offices as he could at the outset of his presidency.291  Washington 
delegated the collection and review of recommendations to the 
Secretary of State.  Washington first utilized this process in 
June 1790 when he received several different United States 
Attorney recommendations for North Carolina.292  The next 
instance occurred in January 1794 during Rhode Island’s 
contentious process to replace Channing.  Randolph, now 
Secretary of State, summarized the debate and provided a 
recommendation for Washington which Washington ultimately 
accepted.293  By 1796, the practice became much more common.  
At that time, Timothy Pickering, an ardent Federalist, who 
zealously investigated Jeffersonian Republicans during the 
 
the administration until late in the First Congress.  HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra 
note 163, at 1239–47, 1823–31, 1985–93.  Nonetheless, the Administration 
faced Congressional challenges.  When Washington sought its advice on a 
treaty, he left irritated because the Senate did not simply consent.  Id. at 1823–
31.  When Hamilton introduced his economic program, it was met with strong 
opposition.  Id. at 1985–93.  These actions illustrate the nation’s partisan 
divide. 
287.  ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 18, at 18–28. 
288.  FERLING, supra note 167, at 213–23. 
289.  Id. at 220–22; WOOD, supra note 162, at 90–92. 
290.  WOOD, supra note 162, at 106–11. 
291.  See RICHARD NORTON SMITH, PATRIARCH: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND 
THE NEW AMERICAN NATION 130 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1993) (stating the 
Presidency changed Washington because he increasingly asserted his 
executive authority). 
292.  Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State on 
Recommendations for Federal Offices in North Carolina and the Southwestern 
Government (June 7, 
1790), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-16-02-0274.  
293.  Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington, supra note 
264. 
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Adams Administration, chose several United States 
Attorneys.294  Correspondence remains regarding Pickering’s 
recommendations of John Davis in Massachusetts and Daniel 
Davis in Maine.295  Pickering wrote: 
 
I was hence induced to write to Stephen 
Higginson, Esqr. of Boston, a private letter, 
requesting him, by enquiring among gentlemen of 
law-knowledge, to ascertain Mr Davis’s 
professional talents. Mr Higginson’s answer I 
received yesterday, and have now the honor to 
inclose [sic]. I also wrote to a nephew of mine in 
Boston for the same information; and his answer 
corresponds with Mr Higginson’s. Both being so 
decidedly in favour [sic] of Mr Davis, I have this 
day transmitted to him his commission; it 
appearing to the Secretary of the Treasury & to 
me, upon comparing your letters to us, that you 
desired no delay in the commissioning of Mr 
Davis, when we should be satisfied of his 
professional abilities.296  
 
Stephen Higginson was a prominent Federalist merchant in 
Massachusetts who would not have endorsed someone 
possessing divergent interests from Higginson.297  Other 
appointments that year included Charles Jackson, of Georgia, 
and Thomas Nelson, of Virginia.298  In one instance, Washington 
 
294.  JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION 
LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 182–87 (Cornell Univ. Press 1963). 
295.  Letter from Timothy Pickering to George Washington, supra note 
221 (stating “[t]he enquiries concerning a successor were made by me before 
the rising of Congress, in expectation of Mr [sic] Lithgow’s resignation”); Letter 
from Timothy Pickering, U.S. Sec’y of State, to George Washington, U.S. 
President (July 26, 1796), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/99-01-02-00783. 
296.  Letter from Timothy Pickering to George Washington, supra note 
295. 
297.  Higginson, Stephen, (1743 - 1828), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U. S. 
CONGR., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000581 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
298.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate 
(Mar. 2, 1797), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-
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relied on Tobias Lear, one of his personal secretaries, to make 
the selection.299  Washington wrote, “The District [A]ttorney of 
New Hampshire has sent his resignation—I am entirely 
unacquainted with the characters in that line, in that State, and 
would thank you to name the person whom you think best 
qualified to succeed Mr. Sherburne, & most likely to give general 
satisfaction.”300  Both incidents show Washington’s deference to 
his advisors and his lack of knowledge about qualified 
candidates. 
Nearly all of Washington’s appointments had strong 
Federalist credentials and the few exceptions demonstrate the 
rule.  Several of Washington’s Federalist appointments have 
been identified previously, falling under multiple politicization 
categories.  Livermore, in New Hampshire, replaced Sherburne 
who resigned to pursue other avocations.301  Sherburne’s 
political leanings are demonstrated by Jefferson nominating 
Sherburne to become a United States Attorney in 1801.302  
Pennsylvania’s United States Attorneys both had strong 
Federalist ties as well.303  Finally, Alexander Campbell, 
nominated in 1791, worked closely with Virginia’s leading 
Federalist, John Marshall.304 
In some places, finding Federalists to represent the 
government proved challenging.  In Kentucky, the 
Administration could not find people willing to serve.305  When 
 
00384; Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to U.S. Senate (Apr. 
28, 1796), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-
00474. 
299.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to Tobias Lear 
(Sept. 25, 1793), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-14-
02-0095. 
300.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
301.  Letter from John Samuel Sherburne to George Washington, supra 
note 252. 
302.  Id. at n.1; Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. President, on 
the Draft of Interim Appointments (Dec. 26, 1801), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-02-0183-0005. 
303.  MCFARLAND, ET AL., supra note 234, at 27–28; Alicia M. Parks, 
William Rawle: Abolitionist, Federalist, Loyalist? LAUREL HILL MANSION 
http://laurelhillmansion.org/Pages/William%20Rawle.html (last visited Sept. 
12, 2018). 
304.  PAUL, supra note 270, at 63, 67. 
305.  MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY, 1789-1816 101 (Princeton Univ. Press 1978). 
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Hamilton obtained his desired whiskey excise tax, much of the 
western populace protested and refused to enforce it.306  
Kentucky was one of the most vigorous opponents.307  
Washington attempted several nominations, but all refused.308  
Only one Federalist stepped forward, William Murray, but he 
only served one year and the post remained vacant until after 
Washington’s presidency.309  In South Carolina, Thomas Parker 
succeeded Pringle in 1792.310  Although Parker’s credentials are 
unknown, he provided Charleston’s customs officers a narrow 
statutory construction during the Administration’s efforts to 
enforce neutrality which permitted the French to arm privateers 
in Charleston.311  When the Federalist Customs Collector, Isaac 
Holmes, reported this to Hamilton, Hamilton responded, “[a]s to 
the construction which the District Attorney has given to the 
Act, I must acknowledge [sic] that it intirely [sic] confounds me. 
After what has been said, I need scarcely add that it must not 
govern your conduct.”312  Despite Parker’s interpretation, 
however, he was not removed but became the longest tenured of 
all of Washington’s appointments.313  This fact reveals that 
Parker’s political leanings as Republicans held the Presidency 
 
306.  Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, The Whiskey Rebellion in Kentucky: A 
Forgotten Episode of Civil Disobedience, 2 J. OF EARLY REPUBLIC 239, 242–48 
(1982). 
307.  Id. at 240. 
308.  TACHAU, supra note 305, at 66. 
309.  Id. at 69–70; Letter from William Murray to Thomas Jefferson, U.S. 
Sec’y of State (Dec. 7, 1792), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/01-24-02-0695. 
310.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate 
(Nov. 19, 1792), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-11-
02-0233 (last visited Sept. 10, 2018. 
311.  Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, to 
Edmund Randolph, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Jan. 2, 1795), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-18-02-0006. 
312.  Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, to Isaac 
Holmes, Collector of Customs, Port of Charleston, (Sept. 4, 1794), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-17-02-0151 (footnote 
omitted).  
313.  See 3 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 236 (Washington Gov’t Printing Office 1821), 
https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llej&fileName=003/llej003.db&recNum=243&itemLink=D
?hlaw:1:./temp/~ammem_GV02::%230030244&linkText=1 [hereinafter 
Thomas Parker]. 
50https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/4
ARTICLE 4_INGRAM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2019  7:42 PM 
2018 GEORGE WASHINGTON’S ATTORNEYS 213 
for most of his tenure.314 
Parker was not the only United States Attorney with a 
contrary political view that Washington tolerated once it was 
revealed.  Pierpont Edwards, in Connecticut, also held strong 
Republican views.315  Edwards aligned with his nephew, Aaron 
Burr, who would become Hamilton’s nemesis.316  In 1792, 
Hamilton expressed skepticism about Edwards’ allegiance, 
informing Washington that Edwards aligned with Burr.317  Near 
the 1792 Presidential election, Vice President Adams wrote his 
wife, “Mr P[ierpont] E[dwards] came off miserably. He gave such 
offence by mentioning his Nephew [Aaron Burr], that they would 
not appoint one Man who had any connection with him.”318  
Supporting Burr politically isolated Edwards, but it did not cost 
him his federal post.319  While this might evidence non-
partisanship, it is equally likely that it reflects uncertainty 
about the President’s power to remove people from office.320  
What is certain, however, is that Washington did not remove 
Parker and Edwards despite their political opposition. 
 
 
314.  Thomas Jefferson became the first Republican president in 1801.  
Presidents, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-
house/presidents/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).  After an eight-year term, he was 
replaced by Madison and Monroe, who both served eight years. Id.  John 
Quincy Adams was the last Republican president, serving until 1829.  Id. 
315.  Heckman, supra note 272, at 671. 
316.  Id.; CHERNOW, supra note 168, at 421–22, 687–89, 702–04; FERLING, 
supra note 167, at 339–47. 
317.  Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, to 
George Washington, U.S. President (Sept. 23, 1792), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-11-02-0074. 
318.  Letter from John Adams, U.S. Vice President, to Abigail Adams 
(Nov. 24, 1792), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-09-02-
0185. 
319.  Heckman, supra note 272, at 673–74. 
320.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary 
Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997); 
Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and 
Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1563 (1997) (discussing the 
scholarly debate); see also Currie, supra note 108, at 196–201 (discussing the 
Congressional debate in the First Congress); Letter from James Madison, 
Member, U.S. House of Representatives, to Edmund Randolph, U.S. Att’y Gen. 
(June 17, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-
0141 (displaying that James Madison, writing to future Attorney General 
Edmund Randolph, considered the question). 
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V. Effects of Politicization 
 
Undoubtedly politics influenced Washington’s United 
States Attorney selections and he had no evident qualms about 
using political preferences as a basis for appointments.  
Washington sought people who shared his vision because those 
whom he selected would publicly represent the government’s 
positions.321  Although politicization is used in a critical or 
derogatory fashion today, Washington’s politicized selections 
had important effects that should inform the modern debate 
surrounding politicization.  First, by hiring people who 
represented specific political positions, the citizenry could voice 
their support of or objection to the position.  Second, by including 
Congress in the process and relying on their political 
connections, Washington’s decisions were not unilateral but 
represented the voice of government as a whole.  Finally, by 
representing the government as a whole, Washington’s 
selections represented the will of the “people,” for better or 
worse. 
 
A. Democratic Check on Federal Government Power 
 
Most view politicizing criminal prosecution as an abuse of 
power.322  If political preferences are used in hiring, then 
politically-motivated prosecutions will result.323  Politically 
motivated prosecutions are improper because they are not based 
on actual law violations.324  This reasoning reveals a lack of faith 
in jury trials.325  If we trust juries to decide cases based on law 
 
321.  See generally Ingram, supra note 173. 
322.  Jon Entine, A Parable of Politicized Prosecution, AM. ENTERPRISE 
INST. (July 21, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.aei.org/publication/a-parable-of-
politicized-prosecution/print/; Joshua Philipp, Former FBI Agent Explains the 
Problems of Politicized Law Enforcement, EPOCH TIMES (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.theepochtimes.com/former-fbi-agent-explains-the-problems-of-
politicized-law-enforcement_2267235.html. 
323.  Levenson, supra note 50, at 309–10; Frank M. Tuerkheimer, The 
Executive Investigates Itself, 65 CAL. L. REV. 597, 600–02 (1977). 
324.  Broughton, supra note 85, at 164–79; Bruce Green & Rebecca 
Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of Justice?, ALA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming).  
325.  Scholars have neglected juries as a potential check on politicized 
prosecutions.  Beale, supra note 9, at 415–16.  For example, Professor Beale 
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and facts, then politically-motivated prosecutions are not as 
problematic because juries would acquit.  If such prosecutions 
were more than isolated incidents and not based on sufficient 
evidence, then the people could remove the party from power 
with the next election.  Washington’s appointees, in many 
instances, were overtly political.  They pursued prosecutions 
that furthered their political interests.  However, when they did 
this, juries failed to convict, thus establishing a powerful check 
on federal prosecutorial power. 
As Washington’s presidency progressed, he developed 
specific ideas about how to address national problems.326  
However, not everyone agreed with his policy choices.327  Those 
who opposed Washington’s policy choices resisted the laws 
implementing his priorities and prosecutions ensued.328  
Washington trusted his attorneys to present those cases. 
Two specific instances arose during Washington’s second 
term.  First, in 1791, Hamilton convinced Congress to pass an 
excise tax on whiskey.329  Many in the western United States 
 
discusses whether the US Attorney role should be reconceptualized by 
redefining it as a nonpartisan career appointment.  Id.  She ultimately decides 
it is not a good idea because the Justice Department leadership will be 
politically appointed thus allowing the possibility of political influence.  Id.  
She argues the Senate confirmation of US Attorneys provides a 
counterbalance, making United States Attorneys more local and responsive to 
local political influences.  Id.  Others argue that juries do not provide a 
sufficient check.  See Gershman, supra note 4, at 9–19 (describing three 
politically motivated prosecutions that resulted in jury convictions despite 
questionable evidence). 
326.  One pressing problem was the nation’s debt.  Assuming the state’s 
debt and paying it from federal tax revenues was a central feature of Alexander 
Hamilton’s economic policy that Washington adopted.  See FRITZ, supra note 
157, at 172–74.  One particular aspect of this was the whiskey excise tax that 
generated significant and occasionally violent protests.  Id. 
327.  See, e.g., FRITZ, supra note 157, at 175 (discussing the disagreement 
with the whiskey excise); WOOD, supra note 162, at 140–46 (discussing the 
creation of the Bank of the United States). 
328.  The most notorious opposition to Washington Administration 
policies arose during the summer and fall of 1794 when residents of western 
Pennsylvania violently resisted the whiskey excise tax.  See generally WILLIAM 
HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: GEORGE WASHINGTON, ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA’S NEWFOUND 
SOVEREIGNTY (Scribner 2010); THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY 
REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1986) . 
329.  SLAUGHTER, supra note 328, at 3, 93–97. 
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violently resisted its collection.330  In the summer of 1792, 
Hamilton convinced Washington that criminal prosecutions 
were necessary to demonstrate federal resolve.331  Attorney 
General Edmund Randolph had already opined that the conduct 
Hamilton identified was protected by the First Amendment.332  
Nonetheless, acting on Washington’s instructions, the United 
States Attorney for Pennsylvania, William Rawle, initiated 
prosecutions to demonstrate the federal government’s power.333  
The Administration’s hasty efforts were exposed, however, when 
it became apparent that those accused were victims of mistaken 
identity.334  Second, two years later, in 1794, Hamilton and 
Washington led a militia group to confront protesters in western 
Pennsylvania.335  With the rebellion quashed, Rawle initiated 
numerous criminal cases, reinforcing the Administration’s 
desires, creating a broad definition of “levying war” in the 
process.336  Like the first case, most cases ended with dismissals 
or acquittals.337  Only two were convicted and both subsequently 
received pardons.338 
 
330.  Id. 
331.  Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, to 
George Washington, U.S. President (Sept. 1, 1792), https://founders.archives. 
gov/documents/Hamilton/01-12-02-0239. 
332.  Letter from Edmund Randolph, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Alexander 
Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury (Sept. 8, 1792), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-12-02-0261. 
333.  SLAUGHTER, supra note 328, at 160–61, 167, 170; Letter from George 
Washington, U.S. President, to Edmund Randolph, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Oct. 1, 
1792), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-11-02-0097. 
334.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to William Rawle, 
U.S. Dist. Att’y for Pa. (Mar. 13, 1793), http://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-12-02-0243; Letter from Tench Coxe to Alexander 
Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, n.10 (Oct. 19, 1792), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-12-02-0409. 
335.  Richard H. Kohn, The Washington Administration’s Decision to 
Crush the Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. OF AM. HIST. 567, 567–68 (1972). 
336.  Whitman H. Ridgway, Fries in the Federalist Imagination: A Crisis 
of Republican Society, 67 PA. HIST.: J. OF MID-ATLANTIC STUD. 141, 147 (2000); 
see Minutes of the Circuit Court, United States Circuit Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, 1791-1840, ANCESTRY.COM, 
http://search.ancestryinstitution.com/aird/search/db.aspx?dbid=1248 (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2018) (citing a list of cases prosecuted). 
337.  Scott Ingram, Presidents, Politics, and Pardons: Washington’s 
Original (Mis?)Use of the Pardon Power, 8 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 259, 299–
309 (2018). 
338.  Id. 
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While the whiskey rebellion cases only arose in 
Pennsylvania, prosecutions for violations of Washington’s 
neutrality proclamation occurred throughout the Nation.  In 
February 1793, a war began between France and Great Britain 
causing considerable policy problems for the United States due 
to the citizenry divided over whom to support.339  Knowing that 
the United States could not fight a war, Washington declared 
neutrality and warned those who might join a side that they 
would be prosecuted.340  During the summer of 1793, cases arose 
in Pennsylvania,341 Georgia,342 and North Carolina.343  
Federalist prosecutors in each state brought cases without any 
clear legal prohibition regarding the accused’s conduct.344  In at 
least one instance, the facts were not sufficient for a 
conviction.345  While the North Carolina case was dismissed, 
juries in Georgia and Pennsylvania acquitted the Defendants.346  
In 1794, Congress enacted a neutrality statute and more cases 
arose.347  Federalist prosecutors in Massachusetts348 and 
Virginia349 investigated neutrality violation cases.  Only in 
Federalist Massachusetts did a jury convict.350  Juries across the 
 
339.  ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 18 at 308–11; FERLING, supra note 
167, at 244–46. 
340.  WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 26–34 (Univ. of S.C. Press 2006); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, 
supra note 18, at 336–38. 
341.  United States v. Henfield, No. 6360, 1793 U.S. App. LEXIS 16, at 
*1–95 (C.C.D. Pa. May 22, 1793) [hereinafter Henfield’s Case]. 
342.  United States v. Rivers, (C.C.D. Ga. 1793). 
343.  United States v. Olmstead, Minutes of the Circuit Court (C.C.D.N.C. 
1793), NARA-Atlanta Branch. 
344.  Scott Ingram, Replacing the “Sword of War” with the “Scales of 
Justice”: Henfield’s Case and the Origins of Lawfare in the United States, 9 J. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 483, 496–497 (2018) (manuscript at 15–16), 
http://jnslp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Replacing_the_Sword_of_War%E2%80%9D.pdf. 
345.  Henfield’s Case, supra note 341, at 93. 
346.  CASTO, supra note 340, at 100–02. 
347.  Neutrality Act of 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381, 383–84 (1794) (current 
version at 18 U.S.C. § 958 (1994). 
348.  United States v. Samuel Rogers, Case File (C.C.D.Mass. 1794), 
NARA-Boston; United States v. Jonathan Nutting, Case File (C.C.D.Mass 
1794), NARA-Boston. 
349.  United States v. John Sinclair, Minutes of the Circuit Court 
(C.C.D.Va. 1794). 
350.  See supra notes 348–48. 
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country refused to enforce the federal government’s neutrality 
efforts because they disagreed with it.  Only South Carolina’s 
Parker offered any internal resistance.351 
These cases demonstrate how a jury can check government 
power.  Prosecutions resulting from policy enforcement largely 
failed.  Washington’s hand-picked attorneys presented cases to 
the people and the people rejected them. 
Unlike during Washington’s presidency, today’s federal 
cases rarely go to trial.352  One significant reason is that 
prosecutors, rather than juries, now have the final say on policy 
enforcement.353  By only prosecuting cases with ample evidence, 
a jury will never have the opportunity to acquit because 
defendants will plead guilty.354  Without this important check, 
politicized prosecutions can cause significant societal harm.  A 
jury may only exercise its power to check the federal 
government’s policy-oriented prosecutions when defendants 
assert their right to trial. 
 
B. Actual Advise and Consent 
 
While the Judiciary Act gave the President power to appoint 
United States Attorneys, it required the Senate give its advice 
 
351.  See supra notes 310–314 and accompanying text. 
352.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 5–7 (2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/988896/download (reporting that, in 
2016, the year for which statistics are most recent, the United States Attorney 
offices prosecuted 50,973 cases and, of those cases, only 2,195, a mere 4%, went 
to trial); see generally Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the 
Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the 
Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195 (2014). 
353.  See generally Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
701 (2013); Markowitz, supra note 11; Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal 
Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
757 (1999); David Alan Sklansky, The Problems with Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV. 
CRIM. 451 (2018),  https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-
criminol-032317-092440. 
354.  See generally Celesta Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects 
of Uncertainty, 21 L. & SOC’Y REV. 291, 310–11 (1987); Lisa Frohmann, 
Discrediting Victims’ Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of 
Case Rejections, 38 SOC. PROBS. 213, 224 (1991) (discussing prosecutorial 
concerns with convictability); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The 
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 48–58 (2002). 
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and consent.355  When Washington required assistance filling 
the positions, he wisely looked to representatives from the states 
to recommend candidates.  This became the roots of Senatorial 
courtesy.356  While there was no formal hearing about a 
nominee’s suitability, Congress approved Washington’s 
nominations because, in effect, its members selected the 
nominees.  By providing Washington with recommendations, 
Congress enhanced the politicization effects; however, George 
Washington consulted those who shared the Administration’s 
perspective making the nominees more likely to support his 
agenda.357 
More recently, Congress has abandoned this role.358  While 
Congress might subject judicial nominees to more strict 
scrutiny, rarely is any United States Attorney scrutinized, let 
alone challenged.359  Most selections result from discussions 
between lower-level staff at the Justice Department and 
Congressional offices.360  This is why President Trump’s 
discussions with potential United States Attorney nominees 
raised such concern.361  There could be no other reason for a 
President to meet with a potential nominee, other than to exert 
improper influence over that person or to ensure that person is 
loyal to the Administration.362 
However, this is exactly what Washington had in mind 
when making his United States Attorney selections.  He wanted 
people loyal to the federal government who would represent the 
federal government’s interests in court.  Washington consulted 
 
355.  Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1949). 
356.  EISENSTEIN, supra note 64; see also Richman, supra note 5, at 289–
90; Mitchel A. Sollenberger, Georgia’s Influence on the U.S. Senate: A 
Reassessment of the Rejection of Benjamin Fishbourn and the Origin of 
Senatorial Courtesy, 93 GA. HIST. Q. 182 (2009). 
357.  Perry, supra note 14, at 143–46 (discussing how U.S. Attorney type 
could affect behavior, responsiveness to Administration agenda). 
358.  Kent, supra note 9, at 28–30; Tuerkheimer, supra note 323, at 620–
22 (arguing that senatorial courtesy in United States Attorney appointments 
enhances political influence and minimizes advice and consent). 
359.  See Michael J. Nelson & Ian Ostrander, Keeping Appointments: The 
Politics of Confirming United States Attorneys, 37 JUST. SYS. J.  211 (2016). 
360.  Eisenstein, supra note 57, at 242–48. 
361.  Smith, supra note 28. 
362.  Id. 
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with those who supported his Administration; they thought like 
him and knew his desire to make the new government succeed 
and become respected among the populace. 
 
C. Balancing National versus Local Politics 
 
When people are elected to public office pursuant to our 
constitutional system, it is presumed that they represent the 
public’s will363 because they were elected to advance particular 
political ideas.364  The Nation’s diversity ensures that a 
significant percentage of the populace may not like those ideas.  
When those ideas manifest themselves in criminal law, then 
prosecutions naturally follow those enactments.365  One benefit 
of separating politics and prosecution is the independence 
United States Attorneys gain to address important local 
matters.366  However, Washington’s politicized selections and his 
expectations that they advance policy and partisan interests 
demonstrate that politicization does not mean United States 
Attorneys cannot still address local problems. 
Washington’s United States Attorney selections were 
chosen for their support of Federalists, both Constitutional and 
Hamiltonian.  They were expected to enforce the 
Administration’s policies.  However, they also had to be 
respectable local figures.  Washington, consistent with his 
overall philosophy and practical necessity, deferred to the 
decisions of his United States Attorneys.  This deferment and 
discretion appeared in several national policy-related matters. 
 
 
363.  See NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND 
GENEALOGY 24–25 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2008) (noting that this is just one theory 
of representative democracy—two others have no relationship between the 
people’s will and the representative’s actions); see also Grossback et al., supra 
note 103, at 712–13. 
364.  See URBINATI, supra note 363, at 24–25. 
365.  See Broughton, supra note 85, at 156; Simons, supra note 5, at 895–
99; see also Karen J. Maschke, Prosecutors as Crime Creators: The Case of 
Prenatal Drug Use, 20 CRIM. JUST. REV. 21 (1995); but see James D. Calder, 
RICO’s “Troubled. . . Transition”: Organized Crime, Strategic Institutional 
Factors, and Implementation Delay, 1971-1981, 25 CRIM. JUST. REV. 31 (2000) 
(arguing that the executive branch requires a period of adaptation before new 
policy implementation). 
366.  See Lochner, supra note 61, at 272; Richman, supra note 5, at 2105. 
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Two arose in the first years of the presidency.  In 1790, the 
new federal government focused on economic interests and 
ensuring domestic tranquility with Native American tribes.367  
Dealing with the former meant establishing the legitimacy of 
government securities.368  Counterfeiting was rampant;369  the 
government had to prosecute vigorously.  In one interstate 
investigation and prosecution, Washington deferred to his 
Attorney’s expertise and recommendations.  In early April 1790, 
United States Attorney William Lewis heard from the jailer in 
Philadelphia that a person in custody wished to speak with him 
about a federal crime.370  Lewis went to the jail and learned of a 
counterfeiting operation in New Jersey and New York.371  The 
person confined, Smith, would only provide the information in a 
sworn format upon receipt of a pardon.372  Lewis lacked pardon 
authority and sent the information to Washington and Chief 
Justice John Jay.373  At the same time, Richard Harrison, in New 
York, and Abraham Ogden, in New Jersey, were dealing with 
others involved in the case and also corresponding with Jay.374  
Without waiting for additional information, Washington trusted 
Lewis’s judgment and granted the first pardon in United States 
federal history.375  Washington trusted Lewis not because they 
worked closely but because Washington knew he and Lewis 
shared the same priorities. 
When dealing with the tribes, Washington proclaimed, “all 
officers of the United States, as well civil as military, and all 
 
367.  FERLING, supra note 167, at 203–05 (discussing Washington’s 
selection of Hamilton as Treasury Secretary and the speed at which he 
initiated his economic program); WOOD, supra note 162, at 111–19 (identifying 
border security as the main problem confronting the new administration). 
368.  See STEPHEN MIHM, A NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS: CAPITALISTS, CON 
MEN, AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 1–19 (Harv. Univ. Press 2007). 
369.  Id. at 6–9. 
370.  See Letter from William Lewis to George Washington, U.S. 
President (Mar. 7, 1791), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/ 
05-07-02-0294. 
371.  Id. 
372.  Id. 
373.  Id. 
374.  See Letter from John Jay, U.S. Chief Justice, to George Washington, 
U.S. President (Mar. 11, 1791), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/05-07-02-0312. 
375.  See Ingram, supra note 337, at 285–88. 
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other citizens and inhabitants thereof, to govern themselves 
according to the treaties and act aforesaid; as they will answer 
the contrary at their peril.”376  He knew many citizens wanted 
tribal lands and could forcibly take it.  However, taking it 
constituted an act of war and violated treaty terms.377  
Therefore, prosecution was essential for deterrence and 
retribution.  In one instance, James O’Fallon advertised his 
desire to form an army, invade tribal lands, and establish a new 
nation in the southwest United States.378  Word reached the 
Administration, who determined prosecution was necessary.379  
Jefferson, as Secretary of State, sent Kentucky’s United States 
Attorney, William Murray, instructions to investigate.380  Over 
the next six weeks, Murray collected information about 
O’Fallon’s activities.381  When Murray completed his task, he 
determined that there was no threat and that O’Fallon was more 
talk than action.382  Murray refused to prosecute, even for riot as 
Attorney General Randolph had suggested.383  Despite the need 
to demonstrate executive action to enforce its treaty obligations, 
Washington deferred to Murray.  Similar to Lewis, Washington 
and Murray did not have any pre-existing relationship.  Instead, 
Murray was a Federalist.  Washington understood Murray 
would prosecute if the case was viable because Murray 
supported both Washington’s desire for the federal government 
to succeed and Washington’s policies. 
Two years later, Washington confronted a similar issue with 
 
376.  George Washington, U.S. President, Proclamation (Aug. 26, 1790), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-06-02-0159. 
377.  Id. 
378.  See Letter from Henry Knox, U.S. Sec’y of War, to George 
Washington, U.S. President, n.4 (Jan. 22, 1791), http://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-07-02-0146. 
379.  Id. 
380.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State, to William 
Murray (Mar. 22, 1791), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-
19-02-0159. 
381.  See Letter from William Murray to Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of 
State (May 12, 1791), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-20-
02-0139. 
382.  Id. 
383.  See Opinion of Attorney General on the Case of James O’Fallon, 14 
February 1791, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/01-19-02-0049 (last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
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neutrality between France and Great Britain.384  Despite 
Washington’s calls for neutrality, American citizens joined 
French privateers.385  To prevent war with Great Britain, the 
United States had to prosecute these violations.386  Yet even 
under these circumstances, Washington deferred to his chosen 
United States Attorneys when they believed a prosecution was 
not viable.  One of the first reports came in early May, just weeks 
after Washington issued the Neutrality Proclamation.387  A 
French vessel, the Sans Culotte, captured a British vessel and 
sailed it up the Chesapeake Bay into the Choptank river area.388 
Based on the advice of a Congressman, the local customs 
inspector detained the vessel and learned a Maryland citizen 
captained it.389  Around the same time, the United States 
Attorney, Zebulon Hollingsworth, learned of the activity and did 
not think prosecution was possible.390  Jefferson instructed 
Hollingsworth that prosecuting the captain was essential to 
United States national security.391  Despite this, the captain, 
John Hooper, was never prosecuted.392  The Administration did 
 
384.  See CHARLES MARION THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A 
STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT 21 (Faculty of Political Science of Colum. Univ. 
eds., AMS Press, Inc. 1931). 
385.  ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 18, at 335. 
386.  See Ingram, supra note 344, at 494. 
387.  See Letter from William Vans Murray, Member, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury (May 8, 
1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-14-02-0287; 
Letter from William Vans Murray, Member, U.S. House of Representatives, to 
Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State (May 9, 1793), http://founders.archives. 
gov/documents/Jefferson/01-25-02-0639.  
388.   Letter from William Vans Murray to Alexander Hamilton, supra 
note 387, at n.3; Letter from William Vans Murray to Thomas Jefferson, supra 
note 387. 
389.   Letter from William Vans Murray to Alexander Hamilton, supra 
note 387, at n.3; Letter from William Vans Murray to Thomas Jefferson, supra 
note 387. 
390.   Letter from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Zebulon 
Hollingsworth (June 25, 1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/01-26-02-0335. 
391.  Id. 
392.  The extant records from the Maryland District and Circuit Courts 
do not indicate any case against Mr. Hooper in 1793 or 1794.  In fact, other 
than Hollingsworth’s first court appearance in the May, 1793 term, there is no 
record of him appearing in court during the Circuit Court sessions.  See Mins. 
of the Circuit Court of Md., Nat’l Archives – Phila. 
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not protest and continued working with Hollingsworth.393  
Hollingsworth had the Administration’s trust because they 
shared ideological values.  The vessel eventually sailed from 
Choptank back into the Atlantic and arrived near Norfolk where 
it took on more armaments and crew.394  This time, the matter 
was referred to the United States Attorney for Virginia, 
Alexander Campbell, another trusted attorney, who also 
declined to prosecute, citing that his interpretation of the 
neutrality proclamation and subsequent instructions rendered 
prosecution impossible.395  Again, Washington relied on 
Campbell’s loyalty.  However, in a similar instance, when 
Thomas Parker refused to prosecute a case in South Carolina, 
Alexander Hamilton turned to Secretary of State Randolph to 
send Parker additional instructions about proceeding in the 
case.396  Parker’s politics were more akin to South Carolina’s 
Governor who allowed the French to outfit the initial privateers 
in Charleston and subsequently set in motion the need to 
vigorously enforce neutrality through the courts.397 
In today’s environment, trusted appointees are those 
lacking political connection.398  Today’s Presidents know even 
less about their United States Attorney appointees than 
Washington did.399  Today’s process includes many more 
 
393.  Hollingsworth remained in office until 1805 when he resigned. See 
Notes on Appointments, 23 December 1805, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-2865 (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2018). Despite the fact Hollingsworth remained in office, Jefferson did 
not hold a strong opinion of his attorney for Maryland. When Jefferson became 
President he held a cabinet meeting on appointments and slated Hollingsworth 
for firing after September. See Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. 
President, on a Cabinet Meeting (Dec. 23, 1805), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-34-02-0101.  Despite this, 
Hollingsworth remained.  Notes on Appointments, supra. 
394.  Letter from Henry Lee, Governor of Va., to Thomas Jefferson, U.S. 
Sec’y of State (Oct. 4, 1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/01-27-02-0197. 
395.  Id. 
396.  Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, to 
Edmund Randolph, U.S. Sec’y of State (Jan. 2, 1795), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-18-02-0006). 
397.  C.L. BRAGG, CRESCENT MOON OVER CAROLINA: WILLIAM MOULTRIE 
AND AMERICAN LIBERTY 254–58 (Univ. Of S.C. Press 2013). 
398.  EISENSTEIN, supra note 64, at 41–47; Levenson, supra note 50, at 
310–11. 
399.  See supra notes 358–362 and accompanying text. 
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bureaucratic layers that mitigate political influence as much as 
possible.400  This makes establishing trust between the 
President and the appointed prosecutors difficult because the 
entire relationship is built around the notion that federal 
prosecutors will prosecute cases in a politically neutral fashion 
without input from the person who appointed them.401  Yet this 
makes federal prosecutors unaccountable.  For the systemic 
checks on prosecutorial power to function properly, prosecutors 
must be politically accountable.402  Washington understood this 
and ensured that those he selected had his trust.  While all did 
not perform as expected, he trusted his people to balance the 
political interests entrusted to them. 
Only three of the four politicization types appear in 
Washington’s United States Attorney appointments.  
Unsurprisingly, Washington never had occasion to select people 
to protect him or his Administration from governmental 
criminal investigation.  The opportunity to employ this type of 
politicization in hiring is exceedingly rare.  It requires a vacancy 
in an office that is investigating the President or a key 
Administration official.  Only a small handful of offices could do 
this.  However, more significant for Washington’s time is the 
manner in which such investigations occurred.  Initially, 
Congress performed these investigations.  In late 1792 to early 
1793, Hamilton confronted allegations that he personally 
benefited from his economic program.403  Eventually, the 
Congressional investigation cleared Hamilton.404  Congress 
remained the primary investigator of executive branch conduct 
until after the Civil War.405 
If Washington politicized his appointments, why not remove 
them when they acted contrary to Washington’s political wishes?  
Washington did not remove them for two reasons.  First, 
 
400.  Id. 
401.  Id. 
402.  Beale, supra note 9, at 413–38 (suggesting reforms to selecting 
United States Attorneys and analyzing the potential effects of removing 
political influence). 
403.  ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 18, at 296–301. 
404.  Id.  
405.  MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS, THE ERA OF GOOD STEALINGS 20–22 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1993); see also Bernard Schwartz, Executive Privilege and 
Congressional Investigatory Power, 47 CAL. L. REV. 3, 23–24 (1959). 
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Washington, and those like him, denied factions existed.406  They 
understood the ideological differences, but factions had to be 
avoided.407  By removing those who did not act as Washington 
preferred, factions could result which would undermine the 
national unity George Washington sought.408  Second, there was 
uncertainty about the President’s removal power.409  Did 
Washington have the authority to remove Senate-confirmed 
appointees?  Having many other political battles to wage, 
Washington accepted that, once confirmed, he could not remove 
the office holder.410 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Politicizing criminal prosecution is not new, as it did not 
originate with Watergate in the 1970s.  Instead, efforts to curb 
politicization arose then.411  A clear line emerged between 
political appointees and career prosecutors.  This permitted 
some political control, but as scholars have noted, career 
prosecutors can wait for the next Administration to remove 
political obstacles to the career prosecutor’s agenda.412  Prior to 
Watergate, the entire federal criminal prosecutorial machinery 
turned over whenever a new political party assumed the White 
House.413  They did this because the new Administration wanted 
its people with similar political views in these important 
positions.414  Selecting people based on their political viewpoints 
originated with Washington’s selections.  He chose people loyal 
to his specific policy and political agendas, ensuring that his 
 
406.  ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 18, at 263–70. 
407.  Id. 
408.  FERLING, supra note 154, at 273–74; GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 131 (Univ. Press of Kan. 
1993). 
409.  See supra note 319 (removal power uncertainty). 
410.  MILLER, supra note 18, at 30–31. 
411.  See Eisenstein, supra note 57, at 235 (identifying five factors 
promoting the independence of United States Attorneys, which is the converse 
of politicization and often equates to autonomy from the dictates of the Justice 
Department); see also Kent, supra note 9, at 5–12. 
412.  Lochner, supra note 61, at 282–84. 
413.  Eisenstein, supra note 57, at 228–29, 233. 
414.  Id. at 233. 
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policies were enforced and the government followed the course 
he devised. 
Two key lessons emerge from Washington’s practice.  First, 
politicization provides important benefits.  The debate about 
politicized prosecutions cannot be reduced to a simple 
dichotomy.  Politicization takes multiple, interrelated forms.  
Prosecutorial positions are a reward for loyalty.  Prosecutors 
must enforce specific policy positions that often are ideological 
and partisan.  This is the nature of our system, and we must 
remember that the elected party has, at minimum, a 
constitutional mandate to pursue its policy vision.  The concern 
arises when prosecutors target political adversaries or protect 
political allies. 
Addressing the concern about targeting political 
adversaries is at the heart of the second lesson.  We have this 
concern because we do not trust our political and constitutional 
processes to deal with the effects of politicization.  While we 
might have good reason to distrust these processes, 
circumventing the processes in the name of political neutrality 
further erodes the political and constitutional processes.  
Washington chose attorneys who perceived national concerns 
similarly to him.  He trusted them to enforce his political 
objectives.  In many instances the popular will held different 
views.  When Washington’s attorneys prosecuted cases in 
accordance with Washington’s objectives, the public exercised 
their constitutional duty and checked prosecutorial power by 
finding people not guilty.  When matters of public corruption 
emerged, Congress exercised its constitutional role and 
investigated.  Ultimately, the people accepted the outcomes.  
Power was not abused because the checks worked.  This is not to 
say abuses will not happen; however, if the political and 
constitutional checks are in place, then the abuses are remedied 
quickly. 
Criminal prosecution is an inherently political act.  It is a 
decision to use the government’s power.  Preferences are an 
important basis for political and prosecutorial decision-making.  
Rather than bar politicized prosecution, we must revitalize the 
criminal justice system’s political and constitutional checks on 
it. 
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